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Entrepreneurs need resources. Previous research has established that entrepreneurs send signals 
of “quality” to potential resource providers in order to obtain resources. However, a behavioral 
research approach would contend that resource acquisition depends on much more than venture 
quality signals. In this dissertation, I extend beyond the signaling paradigm and investigate the 
resource acquisition process using a framework contingent on entrepreneur signals, resource 
provider dispositional differences, and their interactive effects. Specifically, I leverage regulatory 
focus theory and regulatory fit theory to augment and move beyond the signaling theory 
approach. Methodologically, I undertake two studies. The first study uses archival field data 
consisting of a sample of 895 new venture pitches. In each of these pitches, I analyze the 
displays of promotion and prevention focus sent by entrepreneurs across video and textual 
narratives. To complete this analysis I develop novel measures of promotion and prevention 
focus suitable for computer-aided textual analysis (CATA). In the second study, I use a sample 
of 120 investors and a quasi-experimental approach to assess the moderating role of investor-
level promotion and prevention focus on the relationship between entrepreneur displays of 
promotion and prevention focus and resource acquisition. The findings and their implications are 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Highights  
Theoretical highlights: 
This research... 
o Contributes to the strategic judgment literature by drawing upon a well-
established stream of social-psychology research to consider the role of self-
regulation in the resource allocation process.  
o Integrates the regulatory focus literature with the new venture resource 
acquisition literature in order to develop a conceptual framework to explain 
how resource acquisition for new firms is influenced by factors at multiple 
levels (i.e. the firm/entrepreneur level and individual investor level) 
 
Methodological highlights: 
o A novel instrument for measuring regulatory focus using Computer Aided 
Textual Analysis (CATA) methodology is developed.  
o The external validity of the regulatory focus construct is advanced through a 
novel mixed-methodology approach at the strategic-organization level 
(experimental techniques combined with a field-based content analysis).   
 
Practical highlights: 
o Contrary to popular anecdotal advice given to entrepreneurs, this research 
argues that displays of prevention focus can increase the likelihood of 
acquiring resources, particularly when a prevention-fit  occurs between the 
prevention displays and the resource provider’s dominant regulatory focus.  
o Best practices and contingency considerations for developing fundable pitches 





1.2 Introduction  
Acquiring resources in the early stages of venture creation is critical for new 
venture survival (Bhide, 2003). Because new ventures tend to lack valuable strategic 
resources (Aghion & Tirole, 2004), firm founders are inclined to pursue proactive 
strategies in order to acquire critical resources from external parties (Zott & Huy, 2007). 
However, given the hazards and liabilities associated with nascent ventures 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), external parties are often reluctant to commit resources in the early 
stages of venture development (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). 
Consequently, much previous research has focused on how entrepreneurs signal 
the quality of their ventures to external resource providers (e.g., investors, bankers, 
suppliers, providers of labor). To signal quality entrepreneurs often develop scripted or 
unscripted pitches to increase their chances of acquiring resources from external resource 
holders (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009). Such scripts or narratives are commonly found in 
various business documents including business plans, company websites, shareholder 
letters, and more recently crowdfunding profiles (e.g., Allison, McKenny, & Short, 2013; 
Ciuchta, Letwin, Stevenson, & McMahon, 2016).  
There is a plethora of excellent research focused on understanding the criteria that 
resource providers use to analyze such narratives and make resource allocation decisions. 
For instance, MacMillan, Siegel and Narasimha (1986) identified  a number of cognitive 
criteria that venture capitalists use to evaluate new venture proposals. These categories 
include evaluations of the entrepreneur’s ability, evaluations of the characteristics of the 
product or service, evaluations of the characteristics of the market, and the financial 
considerations of the investment. Likewise, Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque (2011) 
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identified eight key criteria to explain how angel investors quantify business quality 
deficiencies in a non-compensatory way during the resource allocation decision process. 
A variety of other work has investigated and developed lists of the key cognitive investor 
criteria that theoretically drive resource allocation decisions (e.g., Feeney, Haines, & 
Riding, 1999; Haines Jr., Madill, & Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004; Sudek, 2006). In 
terms of theoretical structure, a wide assortment of such work has drawn primarily upon 
theories of signaling (e.g., Backes-gellner & Werner, 2007; Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; 
Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015). In addition, this stream of “resource provider 
criteria” has been particularly focused on understanding the decision criteria of 
sophisticated and professional private market investors, such as venture capitalists or 
angel investors.  
While the insights garnered from the body of extant research in this area have 
been many, there has been growing empirical interest in understanding how non-
professional private market resource providers make resource allocation decisions. 
Moreover, theoretical interest in understanding how less than fully cognitive factors drive 
judgments and resource allocation decisions has recently intensified (Grégoire, 
Cornelissen, Dimov, & van Burg, 2015; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). Although 
extant research in the strategic management literature suggests that quality signals can 
positively impact resource acquisition through standard channels of new venture 
communications (e.g., Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), little work has specifically attempted 
to unpack the conative ‘micro-social’ processes that impact resource acquisition 
decisions.i For instance, what factors outside of “espoused” core investment criteria 
might shift resource provider decisions in significant ways? Beyond this, how might the 
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implicit matching between entrepreneur signaling and external resource provider conative 
mindsets impact the allocation of resources?  
In this dissertation, I leverage regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), a social-
psychology theory of goal pursuit to investigate the role of conative (i.e., less than fully 
cognitive; Johnson, Rosen, & Chang, 2010) resource provider factors in new venture 
resource allocation decisions. As well, I show how entrepreneur displays of regulatory 
focus - self regulatory strategies that individuals use to govern their goal striving 
behaviors - provide important cues about the ways in which entrepreneurs intend to 
manage their firms and ultimately impact their likelihood of successfully acquiring 
resources. Regulatory focus theory, with its clarity around the forces of motivations, 
goal-strategies, and conative behaviors provides a well-established social-psychological 
framework suitable for integration into the domain of new venture resource acquisition.  
Brockner, Higgins, and Low (2004) theorized about the underpinnings of 
regulatory focus in the new venture resource acquisition context. Despite the growth of 
regulatory focus theory as an explanatory framework in the context of organizations over 
the past decade (for extensive reviews and meta-analytic analyses see Gorman et al., 
2012; Johnson, Smith, Wallace, Hill, & Baron, 2015; Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), 
their proposed relationships were not empirically tested. Comprehensively, my 
investigation of regulatory focus signals and investor-level regulatory orientations 
provide evidence that resource provider social psychological influences also play a 
significant role in the resource acquisition process.  
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1.3 Format and Layout  
 
This dissertation is structured as follows. First, I briefly outline the relevant 
literature in chapter two. Next, in chapter three, I outline my integrative theoretical 
arguments and develop formal hypotheses at the intersection of resource acquisition, 
regulatory focus, and regulatory fit. In chapter four, I introduce and present the findings 
from two empirical studies to test my hypotheses. Finally, in chapter five, I discuss the 







CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Resource Acquisition in Entrepreneurship 
 Resource acquisition is critical for new ventures, as new ventures need resources 
in order to launch, grow, and gain legitimacy (Bhide, 2003; Kotha & George, 2012; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover, the contention that competitive advantage is contingent 
upon resource acquisition has become a cornerstone principle of strategic management 
(Barney, 1991; Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Penrose, 1959). Since organizations 
are continually challenged to improve performance, firms need to pursue proactive 
strategies in order to acquire these critical resources (George, 2005). Recent empirical 
work has highlighted the importance of resource acquisition for firm legitimacy (Zott & 
Huy, 2007), firm survival (Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007),  and operational 
performance (Rungtusanatham, Salvador, Forza, & Choi, 2003). 
Acquiring resources in the nascent stage is important because it sets the stage for 
subsequent, reoccurring, or later stage resource acquisition which functions to enhance 
long-term performance (Patel & Jayaram, 2014; Zott & Huy, 2007). In this way, success 
achieved in acquiring early-stage resources improves the firm’s ability to pursue and 
obtain additional resources in the future. Thus, success in early stage resource acquisition 
is not only vital for the launch stage but is also important over the long term, as it 




2.1.1 The Challenge of Acquiring Resources for New Ventures 
Firms understand that resource acquisitions should be a paramount goal and one 
that is critical to their own existence (George, 2005). However, acquiring resources is not 
a straight-forward nor well-defined process for early stage firms. Indeed, there are 
immense challenges associated with resource acquisition that contribute to the high 
failure rate of firms (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014). In fact, 
failure rates in the first five years of business are reported to be 50% and 78% for small 
businesses and new technology ventures respectively (Song, Podoynitsyna, van der Bij, 
& Halman, 2008; U.S Small Business Administration, 2012). In light of this, scholars 
have made it a priority to understand the sources of firm success with regard to resource 
acquisition (e.g., Maxwell & Lévesque, 2011; Moss et al., 2015; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002).  
The data on financial resource acquisition failure rates is even more dismal than 
the data on overall firm failure rates. Nearly 97% of ventures seeking capital fail to attract 
funding (Riding, Madill, & Haines Jr, 2007). In fact, even among the most capable 
growth firms, only a small percentage are successful at securing financial resources from 
traditional equity investors. Analysis from the Kauffman Foundation using data from the 
Inc. 500 fastest growing companies list demonstrates that only 14.2% of firms attracted 
traditional sources of equity funding during their launch and growth stages (Harrison, 
2015; Displayed as Table 1). Nascent firms fail to attract capital at such high rates 
because the majority of these firms lack proven competencies or valuable resources that 
tend to attract external resource providers (Zott & Huy, 2007).  
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Given the risks associated with early stage investing and the entrepreneurship 
process in general (Stinchcombe, 1965), resource holders are often reluctant to commit 
their capital or resources to new ventures (Bhide, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). 
Scholars argue that this reluctance centers on the high levels of information asymmetry 
that is replete in new venture investment opportunities (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). That is 
to say, the entrepreneur knows much more about the internal attributes of his or her own 
venture than the investor (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; Pollack & Bosse, 2014; 
Steverson, Rutherford, & Buller, 2013).  
Related scholarship also endorses that the lack of available and verifiable 
information for investors is the key difference between the new venture investment 
setting and the public market setting (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Müller, 2013). Thus, 
to effectively acquire resources, firms must find ways to communicate with investors by 
using language (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; e.g., Mollick, 2014; Nagy, Pollack, 
Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012), symbols (e.g., Rutherford, Buller, & Stebbins, 2009; Zott 
& Huy, 2007), strategic actions (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Wry, Lounsbury, & 
Jennings, 2014; Wry & Lounsbury, 2013), or other strategies that convey the 





Table 1: Sources of Capital for New Ventures 
 
Kauffman Study of Small 
Businesses 
Kauffman Study of 










Bank & other loans        38,059  34.91%     248  49.60% 
Personal savings        32,658  29.96%     322  64.40% 
Friends, family & acquaintances          6,910  6.34%     193  38.60% 
Credit cards          6,756  6.20%     163  32.60% 
Angel investors          6,350  5.82%       37  7.40% 
Venture capital          4,804  4.41%       31  6.20% 
Government related          2,129  1.95%       18  3.60% 
Other / no financing        11,350  10.41%       65  13.00% 
  
 n=109,016 transactions with more 
than 5,000 firms   n=500 firms  










2.1.2 Overview of the Sources of Acquirable Financial Resources  
New ventures are wealth-constrained and typically unable to develop resources 
internally (Aghion & Tirole, 2004).  For this reason, new ventures often require capital 
from external resource providers (Kotha & George, 2012). These resources may be in the 
form of physical goods, knowledge (e.g., Sampson, 2007),  social capital (e.g., Park & 
Steensma, 2012), network ties (e.g., Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012), or financial capital (e.g., 
Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, & Schweizer, 2015; de Bettignies & Brander, 2007; Le & 
Nguyen, 2009; Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007).  
In this dissertation, acquired resources are operationalized in an external 
investment context. Thus, to provide context, I review the literature on the five most 
common classifications of external investments: (1) Initial public offerings, (2) 
Professional private investors: venture capitalists and angel investors, (3) Non-
professional investors: friends, family, and close business associates (4) Non-professional 
investors: equity crowdfunding, (5) Non-professional investors: Non-equity 
crowdfunding. 
 
2.1.2.1 Initial public offerings (IPO)  
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) occur when private ventures become listed on 
public stock exchanges for the first time. These firms “list” or “go public” via IPO in 
order to raise new capital for their firms (Benninga, Helmantel, & Sarig, 2005). 
Completing an IPO requires that firms sell off existing or newly generated shares in 
exchange for cash purchases by institutional or private public market investors (Cornelli, 
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Goldreich, & Ljungqvist, 2006). The money raised by these firms is often used to expand 
operations or to continue to grow existing commercial operations.  
The process of taking a company public via an IPO is complex and costly 
(Benninga et al., 2005; Deeds, Decarolis, & Coombs, 1997). Firms typically do not 
complete an IPO until they have made substantial traction in a particular market, have 
novel patented technologies (e.g., chemical formulations for a new pharmaceutical 
product), or have established resources that can be exploited in the near future (e.g., a 
discovered gold deposit). IPOs are typically not feasible for new ventures since 
successful IPOs generally require proven track records, technologies, or resources.  
One of the key differences between the IPO context and other private financing 
modes (e.g., venture capital, crowdfunding) relates to the availability of public 
information (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Public stock exchanges require formalized and 
fully audited information about firms who wish to list on these exchanges for several 
years prior to listing. As a result, information asymmetry decreases between the 
entrepreneur and the investor during the IPO and public stages of organizational 
development (Rosenbusch et al., 2013).  As information asymmetry decreases, the stories 
or narratives crafted directly by the entrepreneur are less critical determinants of investor 
selection (Zott & Huy, 2007). On the contrary, crafted narratives are theorized to have 
“significant impact on enabling capital acquisition and wealth creation in the emergent or 
earliest stages of new venture formation” (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001: 550), yet this area 





2.1.2.2 Professional private investors: Venture capitalists and angel investors  
Professional private equity markets began to emerge shortly after World War II 
with the development of the first formal venture capital firms (Bygrave & Timmons, 
1992). Today, the professional private equity funding markets consists of angel investors 
and corporate and independent venture capitalists, who participate to varying degrees in 
financing new ventures (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1994; Park & Steensma, 2012). The 
total market for these professional private investments was estimated to account for more 
than $57 billion via more than 70,000 deals in 2012 (PWC, 2013; Sohl, 2013).   
These investors are generally either formalized institutions or accredited private 
individuals. Accredited investors are defined as individuals with “net worth, or joint net 
worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000.” 
Alternatively an individual can be defined as an accredited investor if that individual has 
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or if jointly with the 
individual’s spouse family income exceeds $300,000 in each of the two preceding years, 
[with] a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year 
(Bradford, 2012). As a result of these high income or net worth restrictions, “private” 
markets are often artificially constrained in terms of total market participation and 
liquidity. 
Although much academic work outlines how professional private investors use 
rational decision-making models to select investments (MacMillan et al., 1986; Maxwell 
et al., 2011; Sudek, 2006), contrasting evidence demonstrates that many professional 
private investment decisions rely on intuition and ‘gut-feel’ (Mason & Harrison, 2002; 
Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003). Recent work has broadened this investigation to 
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consider how entrepreneurs might be able to strategically vary their pitch in an effort to 
increase their chances of successfully acquiring resources from private investors. For 
instance, Maxwell & Lévesque (2011) demonstrated how entrepreneurs can increase their 
perceived trustworthiness with investors by utilizing impression management techniques. 
In a similar vein, scholars have examined the influence of signals of entrepreneurial 
passion on the acquisition of resources in professional private investment settings 
(Mitteness, Cardon, & Sudek, 2010; Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012).  
In summary, unlike with IPOs and public markets there is a higher degree of 
uncertainty in angel and venture investments, and thus entrepreneurial storytelling and 
pitching becomes relatively more important for entrepreneurs seeking to acquire 
resources from these professional private investors (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). In these 
investment markets, savvy entrepreneurs frequently utilize impression management 
techniques to send quality signals to private investors (Baron & Markman, 2000; Clark, 
2008). This process is an attempt by the entrepreneur to influence the perceptions of 
external parties about the quality of their venture (Nagy et al., 2012; Parhankangas & 
Ehrlich, 2014; Rutherford et al., 2009).  
 
2.1.2.3 Non-professional investors: friends, family, and close business associates  
In the United States, non-professional investors are typically restricted from 
investing in new ventures based upon the legislation put forth in the long-standing 
Securities Act of 1933. These private placement restrictions are currently enforced by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC; Bradford, 2012). Specifically, the Securities 
Act of 1933 makes the solicitation of unaccredited investors by non-public enterprises a 
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prohibited practice. Initially, this legislation was designed to protect non-sophisticated 
individual investors from fraudulent entrepreneurs that were plaguing the capital market 
system during the 1920’s and 1930’s (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013; Simon, 
1989). However, the legislation has continued to be enforced, thereby effectively 
eliminating or significantly restricting participation in early-stage investment for the great 
majority of non-professional unaccredited investors (Simon, 1989).  
A notable exception to this legislation exists for individuals deemed to be friends, 
family, or close business associates of the entrepreneur seeking capital. This exemption 
allows private firms to raise capital from friends and family without going public by 
utilizing the Regulation D Private Placement Exemptions (Warren III, 1984). Despite this 
exemption, there is some survey evidence that borrowers avoid family finance when 
possible (Robb & Robinson, 2014). Lee & Persson (2012) developed a model which 
explains that, although informal capital from friends and family is offered cheap and in 
abundance, entrepreneurs seem to prefer formal financial capital utilizing arm’s length 
exchanges. They theorize that investments from closely related parties amplify the threat 
of losing relationships and, due to the entrepreneur’s aversion to failure, the demand for 
friends and family funds is diminished.  
 
2.1.2.4 Non-professional investors: equity crowdfunding  
Recently, new legislation has been promoted at the federal level to open up new 
venture investing to individuals who fall outside of the specific classification of friends, 
family, business associates, or accredited investors (Bradford, 2012). Specifically, on 
April 5th, 2012, President Obama signed new legislation intended to repeal certain 
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wording from the Securities Act of 1933, effectively making equity crowdfunding a legal 
and viable alternative for private ventures (Parrino & Romeo, 2012). This legislation, 
known as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act is currently being reviewed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as they work to define the specific 
governing rules for equity crowdfunding. The JOBS Act instructs the SEC to provide an 
exception to the general solicitation prohibition for offerings made in accordance with 
Rule 506. The JOBS Act instructs the SEC to enable equity crowdfunding as a viable and 
legal option for private enterprises. Prior to the JOBS Act, the Securities Act of 1933 
prohibited general solicitation, which effectively prohibited private firms from 
advertising or pursuing funding sources from the Internet, print, or radio (Parrino & 
Romeo, 2012). 
Although President Obama signed the JOBS Act in 2012, the final enactment of 
these rules has been delayed for quite some time by SEC procedures. After close to 
eighteen months since signing the JOBS Act, general solicitation became an official and 
accepted practice with the passing of Title II on September 23, 2013. Title II allows 
investors to advertise their offerings on the Internet, print, or radio, but does specifically 
allow them to receive funds via such portals from unaccredited investors. This is the next 
required step to fully enable equity crowdfunding as a legal practice as mandated in 
section 302(a) of the JOBS Act. In 2013, the SEC panel unanimously voted to define 
rules allowing unaccredited investors to partake in equity crowdfunding, but these rules 
have yet to be defined and are still in the public comment stage. The proposed rules have 
a number of limitations for unaccredited investors. Specifically, individuals who earn less 
than $100,000 per annum may invest up to a maximum of 5% or $2,000 of their annual 
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income. Additionally, proposed rules limit firms to a maximum annual amount of $1 
million annually (SEC, 2013).  
  The introduction of equity crowdfunding via recent statutory modifications (i.e., 
the JOBS Act) indicates a potential transformation for the venture funding landscape 
(Bradford, 2012; Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013). The JOBS Act and related legislation in 
the U.S is intended to allow private firms to raise capital from unaccredited investors for 
the first time in the U.S. since 1933 (Parrino & Romeo, 2012). Equity crowdfunding 
reform has widespread implications for new ventures, the finance industry, and the long-
term prosperity of the economy, as it represents a potential new investment paradigm for 
fund-seeking firms (Harrison, 2013). For the first time in the history of the United States, 
anyone with a computer and some investable capital can function as a source of equity 
capital for new and emerging private ventures (Bradford, 2012).  
 In terms of empirical work conducted to date, it is not surprising that, given the 
recent occurrence of these legal modifications, scholarship on equity crowdfunding is 
only in its infancy. Currently, only one published paper has specifically utilized an equity 
crowdfunding sampling frame (Ahlers et al., 2015). In this paper, Ahlers et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that social capital and intellectual capital have little or no impact on 
funding success in an equity crowdfunding environment. However, human capital signals 
by entrepreneurs and signals about uncertainty or enterprise risks can strongly impact the 
probability of funding success. These initial discoveries contrast findings from extant 
research in traditional private equity markets (e.g., Hsu, 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and 
signify a potential divergence in the factors that predict resource acquisition in 
crowdfunding markets.  
16 
 
2.1.2.5 Non-professional investors: Non-equity crowdfunding 
As noted above, equity crowdfunding has yet to be thoroughly enacted around the 
world. As a result it is only in its infancy in terms of investigation by entrepreneurship 
scholars. However, a related and emerging body of literature on non-equity crowdfunding 
has the potential to inform the entrepreneurship literature as well. In general, non-equity 
crowdfunding can be defined as arms-length transactions with a large pool of generally 
unsophisticated funders that each provide small amounts of capital without the promise of 
stock in the firm (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013; Mollick, 2014). 
According to industry data in 2012, there were more than one million crowdfunding 
campaigns across eight-hundred crowdfunding platforms (Massolution, 2013). In total, 
these campaigns amassed more than two and a half billion dollars in funding 
(Massolution, 2013). 
Non-equity crowdfunding is currently developing in a number of distinct forms. 
These forms include donation-based crowdfunding, peer-to-peer debt crowdfunding, and 
rewards-based crowdfunding. In donation-based crowdfunding, funders contribute to 
projects or organizations in the form of non-repayable donations. Funders are motivated 
by intrinsic motivations or social causes and generally receive no physical incentives or 
financial returns (Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013). In peer-to-peer debt-based crowdfunding, 
funders contribute to campaigns in the form of  repayable loans which may be interest-
bearing or occasionally, if the lender is socially motivated, may be zero-rated but still 
repayable in terms of the principle amount (Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013).  
Initial studies at the intersection of donations-based and peer-to-peer 
crowdfunding have demonstrated that crowdfunding campaigns that frame their narrative 
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as an opportunity to help others increase funding speed relative to narratives that frame 
campaigns as an opportunity for a new business emergence (Allison, Davis, Short, & 
Webb, 2015). In a related study, with a sample of crowdfunding narratives from 
impoverished nations, Allison et al. (2013) concluded that a “warm-glow” feeling 
(Andreoni, 1990) was a predictive factor for crowdfunding projects. Specifically, in this 
study, crowdfunding narratives which emphasized blaming language and present-concern 
raised funding sooner in comparison with narratives which emphasized accomplishments 
and tenacity. In apparent contrast to these findings, other early work in this area has 
demonstrated that displays of empathy, warmth, conscientiousness and courage reduce 
funding prospects (Moss et al., 2015). Moss et al. (2015) also found that narratives which 
signal competitive aggressiveness, risk-taking, and autonomy have the potential to 
increase funding success. These studies have predominantly relied on a textual analysis 
methodology leaving an opportunity for researchers to utilize complementary approaches. 
The third category of non-equity crowdfunding is known as rewards-based 
crowdfunding. In rewards-based crowdfunding, funders provide investments in the form 
of unsecured capital or pre-purchases (Belleflamme et al., 2013). These investments are 
provided for products, services, or other rewards. These other rewards could include 
anything from public acknowledgements (e.g., a thank you note displayed on the 
Internet), interactions (e.g., a rare personal meeting with a company founder or celebrity), 
or experiences (e.g., a guest appearance in movie). In the case of products or services, the 
entrepreneurs often promise to provide these goods or services at a later date, contingent 
upon a successful campaign and after some pre-specified amount of time during which 
the entrepreneur plans to engage in development and initial commercialization.  
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Initial studies in this area have focused on which campaign characteristics 
successfully maximize funding prospects for firms. For instance, displays of social 
capital as operationalized through social network contacts was shown to be positively 
related to the amount of capital raised in rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns 
(Mollick, 2014). Interestingly, however, the lack of any displays of social capital (i.e., not 
having a Facebook account) improved funding prospects for entrepreneurs when 
compared with displays of low social capital (i.e., having very few Facebook friends; 
Mollick, 2014). Other early research in this area has demonstrated that the social capital 
effect on funding success is fully mediated by the capital collected in the campaign’s first 
few days (Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015).  
Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal (2012) undertook similar efforts to investigate the role 
of social influence on funder behaviors. These authors found evidence that campaigns 
convey high levels of social information as well as the presence of crowding-out effects. 
These occur when incremental project contributions decrease the perceived importance of 
the campaign to funders. In terms of funder geography, most initial funders tend to reside 
in the same geographic region as the campaign’s creator (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 
2011). Also, with regard to the delivery of products, services, or other rewards, Mollick’s 
(2014) analysis of over forty-eight thousand rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns 
revealed that, nearly three quarters of the time, products and rewards were not delivered 
by the target date.  
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2.2 The Resource Acquisition Process  
  In the previous section, I outlined the relevant literature related to financial 
resource acquisition in entrepreneurship. Although I do not use it as a core theoretical 
argument to motivate my hypothesis, in the next section I provide an overview of 
signaling theory as it has played a vital role in past literature and seeks to explain how 
signal senders convey information to outsiders. I then briefly outline how signaling 
theory has been used in the entrepreneurship literature.  
 
2.2.1 Brief Background on Signaling  
 Scholars have widely examined how individuals or organizations use displays or 
signals to convey information about their own characteristics or the characteristics of 
their resources to external parties (Connelly et al., 2011). The seminal article that set in 
motion this signaling theory paradigm discusses the inefficacies of purchasing a used car 
to capture the essence of the signaling problem. In his article, The market for "lemons": 
Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism, Akerlof (1970) describes how, in the 
absence of signals, a used car purchaser is unable to detect the quality of a good car or a 
bad car (i.e., a “lemon”). Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information gives the 
current owner of the car an informational advantage over the potential purchaser. Sellers 
of “lemons” may seek to exploit this informational-advantage, whereas sellers of quality 
cars are incentivized to reduce the presence of asymmetric information and attempt to 
send signals about the true quality of their cars.  
Signaling theory first emerged in the field of economics (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973). The theory has become widely accepted. In fact, in 2001 the Nobel Prize in 
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Economics was presented to Spence, Akerlof, and Stiglitz for their work in the discipline. 
The theory was initially used to reconcile the recognition of the presence of imperfect 
information in economic markets (Spence, 1973). The assumption of imperfect 
information in markets continually crept into economic models in the 20th century 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Prior to that time, economists had assumed away any observable or 
unobservable informational imperfections as inconsequential variance in explaining any 
deviations from markets with perfect information (Stiglitz, 2000).  
Since its inception, signaling theory has rapidly developed into an influential 
theory across many other areas of social science as well. For instance, it has been used in 
biology (Zahavi, 1975), political science (Brehm & Gates, 1994), marketing (Swait,́ 
Erdem, Louviere, & Dubelaar, 1993), accounting (Morris, 1987), finance (Bhattacharya 
& Ritter, 1983), strategic management (Goranova, Alessandri, Todd M, Brandes, & 
Dharwadkar, 2007), and, more recently, entrepreneurship (Reuber & Fischer, 2009).   
In terms of its current explanatory value, signaling theory is particularly effective 
for exploring behaviors that one party uses to influence another party when information 
asymmetry is present (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). According to the 
theory, information senders use these signals to communicate positive details to outsiders 
in order to reduce information asymmetry and transactional hazards with potential trading 
partners (Janney & Folta, 2003). Fundamentally, there are two core problems that 
signaling theory can be used to explain. First, how does a signaling party use signals to 
persuade the receiver to take a desired action by conveying quality signals to the 
receiver? Second, how does the receiver determine his or her actions upon analyzing the 
signaling party’s signals? 
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In order for signals to be effective, they must have two principal characteristics: 
costliness and observability (Connelly et al., 2011). Costliness refers to the costs incurred 
by the sender in order to develop and convey signals (Connelly et al., 2011), while 
observability is the degree to which signals are noticeable by outsiders (Connelly et al., 
2011). Effective signals allow signal receivers to differentiate between high quality signal 
senders and low quality signal senders. For example, good employees tend to accumulate 
costly education in order to signal the quality of their labor to employers (Spence, 1973). 
Professional credentials (e.g., Certified Public Accounting designation), college degrees 
(e.g., Bachelor of Science), and industry certifications (e.g., Six Sigma) are all examples 
of observable and costly signals (Moss et al., 2015).  
It is important to note that signals are said to convey two types of information: 
information about existing characteristics of signal senders and information about the 
behavioral intentions of signal senders (Stiglitz, 1990). For investors, both extant 
characteristics and behavioral intentions are critical cues in making their investment 
decisions (Chung, Sensoy, Stern, & Weisbach, 2012; Maxwell et al., 2011; Maxwell & 
Lévesque, 2011). Therefore, strategic managers who are seeking investment have an 
incentive to attempt to convey positive information to investors in their formal 
communications with those investors. For example, Zhang and Wiersema (2009) showed 
how corporate Chief Executive Officers were able to effectively signal unobservable firm 




2.2.2 Signals Sent by Entrepreneurs  
  Entrepreneurs have to sell or pitch their venture ideas to external resource 
providers including potential investors (Chen et al., 2009). To do this, entrepreneurs often 
develop pitch narratives to increase their chances of attracting funding by signaling to 
outsiders where they intend to focus their attention in terms of strategic mission, value 
proposition, and execution plan (Pollack, Rutherford, & Nagy, 2012). Such narratives are 
commonly found in various documents including business plans, company websites, 
shareholder letters, and, more recently, crowdfunding profiles (e.g., Allison et al., 2013; 
Moss et al., 2015).  
Entrepreneurs develop and convey these narratives to outside stakeholders in 
order to attempt to acquire much needed resources. In this way, an entrepreneur can use 
these narratives to send signals that convey characteristics of the firm and indicators of 
the firm’s future behaviors. In terms of how certain language in narrative can lead to 
resource acquisition, there is a large body of work in finance (e.g., Smith & Taffler, 
2000) and accounting (e.g., Morris, 1987). More recently, entrepreneurship scholars have 
begun to adopt this theoretical frame.  
Specifically, in the entrepreneurship literature, signaling theory has been used to 
investigate how entrepreneurs signal reputation in international markets using online 
technology (Reuber & Fischer, 2009), how entrepreneurs signal legitimacy in transition 
economies (Ivanova & Castellano, 2012), and strategic entrepreneurial entry into new 
markets (Levie & Autio, 2011). In terms of early stage finance, signaling theorists have 
investigated the impact of readily observable human capital characteristics (e.g., an 
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entrepreneur’s academic background, management expertise, and technological 
expertise) on resource acquisition and venture survival (Gimmon & Levie, 2010). More 
recently, signaling theory has been employed in micro-lending and rewards-based 
crowdfunding settings. Specifically, early work in this area has been focused on 
understanding how signals drive crowdfunding investments. Initial studies have focused 
on how firm or project level signals attract investment for new ventures (Allison et al., 
2013; Mollick, 2014; Moss et al., 2014). 
  
2.3 Regulatory Focus & Regulatory Fit Theory 
2.3.1 Regulatory Focus Theory 
Regulatory Focus Theory has been commonly used to explain decision processes, 
judgment, and strategies of goal pursuit. In recent years, scholarly work that draws upon 
regulatory focus theory has continued to grow in numerous fields including management, 
marketing, psychology, and finance (Mourali, Böckenholt, & Laroche, 2014; Sassenberg 
& Woltin, 2009). Higgins’ (1997) original regulatory focus theoritical work has been 
cited more than three thousand times. As well, over fourteen different scales have been 
created to measure the construct (Gorman et al., 2012). 
Regulatory focus theory identifies two stylized strategies of self-regulation that 
individuals use to achieve goals. The first strategy is known as promotion focus, while 
the later is known as a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997, 2002). Individuals are said to be 
internally driven or regulated by these two distinct systems, such that high promotion 
focused individuals are oriented to work toward goals that will allow them to achieve 
idealized states (e.g., win an upcoming boxing match by becoming the strongest 
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participant). On the other hand, high prevention focused individuals are oriented to work 
toward goals that allow them to avoid falling out of misalignment with their own desired 
ought-states (e.g., to not lose an upcoming boxing match by avoiding being the weakest 
participant). The previous example highlights that although individual motivations and 
methods might vary, identical outcomes can be reached by using either foci (Grant-
Halvorson & Higgins, 2013; Higgins, 1997). Although all individuals look at goals using 
both ideals and oughts, one or the other typically governs an individual’s mindset at any 
given point in time (Foo, Uy, & Murnieks, 2015). 
Individuals operating primarily within a promotion focus strive for 
accomplishment, advancement, and gains (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). For high 
promotion focused individuals, their own hopes and aspirations tend to be particularly 
salient, which leads individuals to target outcomes that allow them to obtain self-ideals 
(Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010). In this way, promotion focus orientates an 
individual toward using an eagerness strategy to hit targets when working toward their 
goals (Higgins et al., 1997). This eagerness strategy can result in a risky bias whereby 
individuals are more likely to take action in order to decrease the likelihood of missing an 
opportunity (Friedman & Förster, 2001). Related research from Bryant and Dunford 
(2008) showed that promotion focused individuals tend to avoid errors of omission. High 
promotion focused individuals are also more likely to express higher levels of creativity 
(Brockner et al., 2004; Friedman & Förster, 2001) and possess superior skills in 
opportunity recognition tasks (Tumasjan & Braun, 2012). 
In contrast, individuals primarily operating within a prevention focus system are 
concerned with safety and responsibility and tend to focus on avoiding losses (Higgins, 
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1997). Their own duties and obligations are particularly salient, which leads individuals 
to target outcomes that allow them to obtain their ought-selves (Haws et al., 2010). In this 
way, a high prevention focus orientates individuals toward using a vigilance strategy to 
avoid misses when working toward their goals (Higgins et al., 1997). This vigilance 
strategy can result in a conservative bias whereby individuals are more likely to avoid 
action to decrease the likelihood of making an error (Friedman & Förster, 2001). Related 
research shows that prevention focused individuals avoid errors of commission (Bryant & 
Dunford, 2008). As well, prevention focused individuals are more likely to experience 
emotions such as acquiescence and anxiety (Higgins et al., 1997). 
 
2.3.1.1 The Relationship between Promotion and Prevention Focus  
The regulatory focus scholarship has questioned whether or not promotion and 
prevention foci should be conceptualized along a continuum, or whether these 
orientations are better conceptualized as orthogonal modes. Early theorists in this area 
emphasized the orthogonal nature of the promotion and prevention foci (Higgins, 2002). 
This was later supported through empirical testing and meta-analysis (Gorman et al., 
2012; Haws et al., 2010; Summerville & Roese, 2008). Such work emphasizes that 
promotion and prevention foci should be considered as two distinct orthogonal factors 
rather than as opposite ends of a distinct spectrum.  
The implication of this for researchers is two-fold. First, the two dimensional 
nature of regulatory focus implies that it is not sufficient for researchers to hypothesize 
that if a promotion focus has a positive relationship with some outcome variable that a 
prevention focus will have the opposite relationship with that same outcome variable 
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(Haws et al., 2010). Although some previous research has approached the regulatory 
focus construct in this way, a focused attention on the orthogonal relationship between 
promotion and prevention focus should be a concern for the theory and measurement of 
future regulatory focus research (Haws et al., 2010).   
Second, regulatory focus as an individual difference variable could manifest in 
various combinations across individuals. For instance, some individuals could be 
promotion dominant (high in promotion focus while low in prevention focus), others 
could be prevention dominant (high in prevention focus while low in promotion focus). 
Other individuals could be some combination of both foci, such as high-high hybrids 
(high in promotion focus while high in prevention focus), or low-low hybrids (low in 
promotion focus and low in prevention focus).  
 
2.3.1.2 Chronic (Trait-Based) Regulatory Focus  
Regulatory focus has been shown in the literature to manifest in individuals as 
both a chronic (i.e., trait-based) and momentary (i.e., state-based) characteristic (Higgins, 
1997, 1998, 2000a). The chronic form of regulatory focus is a personality variable that is 
theorized to derive from an individual’s upbringing or developmental history (Higgins & 
Silberman, 1998). Bowlby (1973) points out that the vulnerability of human offspring and 
their dependence on others for survival gave rise to these self-regulatory orientations. 
Thus, chronic regulatory focus forms and solidifies during childhood (Higgins & 
Silberman, 1998). Ongoing subjective historical experiences further strengthen these 
chronic dispositions (Higgins et al., 2001), however, chronic regulatory focus 
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dispositions tend to remain fairly stable over time (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005; 
Gamache, Mcnamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015; Higgins & Silberman, 1998).  
In terms of how regulatory focus dispositions relate to other trait-based 
personality differences, Gorman et al.’s (2012) meta-analyses provide evidence that 
conscientiousness and extraversion are both positively related to a promotion focus, while 
neuroticism and anxiety are negatively related to a promotion focus. Theoretically, both 
extraversion and conscientious individuals used an eagerness means (Barrick & Mount, 
1991; Costa & McCrae, 1985; Higgins, 1989). In contrast, neurotic or anxious individuals 
tend to fixate on negative emotions which are often associated with a concern for failure 
(Gorman et al., 2012; Higgins, 1989). Gorman et al. (2012) also demonstrated that a 
prevention focus is positively correlated with anxiety and negative affect while 
negatively correlated with extraversion and self-esteem. Table 2 presents the results from 
Gorman et al.’s (2012) meta-analyses with regard to the personality correlates of 










Sample Size Across Studies 
 
Bright Side Traits: 
Extraversion +.30 -.15 Promotion, n=1054, k=4 
Prevention, n=1054, k=4 
Self-esteem +.21 -.21 Promotion, n=773, k=3 
Prevention, n=773, k=3 
Conscientiousness +.25 +.17 Promotion, n=684, k=2 
Prevention, n=684, k=2 
Optimism +.30 +.02 Promotion, n=263, k=2 
Prevention, n=263, k=2 
Positive Affect +.39 +.01 Promotion, n=925, k=6 
Prevention, n=884, k=5 
 
Dark Side Traits: 
Anxiety  -.17 +.27 Promotion, n=500, k=3 
Prevention, n=500, k=3 
Negative Affect -.02 +.29 Promotion, n=760, k=4 
Prevention, n=801, k=5 
Neuroticism -.18 +.28 Promotion, n=1142, k=5 
Prevention, n=1142, k=5 
 
Learning Traits: 
Performance Goal Orientation -.02 +.22 Promotion, n=542, k=4 
Prevention, n=542, k=4 
Learning Goal Orientation +.34 +.05 Promotion, n=542, k=4 
Prevention, n=542, k=4 
Note. (r) = sample weighted mean correlation. Adapted from Gorman et al. (2012) meta-







2.3.1.3 Momentary (State-Based) Regulatory Focus  
Much like other trait differences, regulatory focus has also been shown to be 
contingent upon situational factors (Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1999). For example, a 
chronic prevention focused individual who is mainly vigilant in her approach to goal 
attainment might shift her approach if certain external factors make promotion outcomes 
(e.g., achievement, eagerness) more salient. Thus, regulatory focus can be situationally 
dependent. Although momentary (state-based) and chronic (trait-based) attributes appear 
to derive from discrete sources (e.g., environmental factors versus biological paths), 
extant individual difference research suggests that they should generally result in parallel 
behavioral outcomes (Baron, Tang, & Hmieleski, 2011; Peters, Rice, & Sundararajan, 
2004). 
 
2.3.2 Regulatory Fit Theory 
Regulatory fit theory is a goal-pursuit theory which proposes that an individual’s 
preferred actions are contingent upon that individual’s regulatory focus (Freitas & 
Higgins, 2002a; Higgins, 2000b). In other words, regulatory fit theory considers the 
amplified motivation or action-based relationships that result when there is a high level of 
regulatory fit between the regulatory focus of the actor and the manner in which that 
actor pursues the goal.   
Promotion focused individuals prefer an eagerness means, while prevention 
focused individuals prefer a vigilance means (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Chen Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Idson, Liberman, 
& Higgins, 2004). When an individual uses their preferred means (eagerness or vigilance) 
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or rewards structures (gains or losses), that individual is said to have experienced 
regulatory fit. Individuals who experience regulatory fit have been shown to anticipate 
and feel more enjoyment while pursuing goals (Freitas & Higgins, 2002a). This is 
referred to as a feeling-right effect, whereby the actor feels right about their strategic 
pursuit of goals (Higgins, 2005). This feeling-right effect can enhance engagement in 
activities (Cesario et al., 2004; Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2008).  
In summary, regulatory fit theory emphasizes the amplified relationships that 
result when there is congruence at high levels between the regulatory focus of the actor 
and the stimuli presented to the actor, or the manner in which that actor pursues the goal. 
It is important to note that regulatory fit theory does not maintain that any amplified 
relationships will occur when a fit occurs at low levels of either regulatory foci (Grant-
Halvorson & Higgins, 2013).  
 
2.3.3 A Note on Alternative Conceptualizations of Fit 
 
Research concerned with the fit between an individual and other environmental 
factors has a long history in social sciences and management research. Models in this 
area are often referred to as models of person-environment fit (P-E fit). In general P–E fit 
refers to the matching of characteristics or factor similarities between individual persons 
and the environment (Edwards, 2008; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).  
Work in the P-E fit area originated from “matching model” analysis that assessed 
fit between characteristics of individuals and particular vocations (Parsons, 1909). From 
there, research on P-E fit has been widespread and varied, including work that 
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investigates person-environment fit and its effects on occupational stress (Edwards, 
1996), employee satisfaction (Duffy, Autin, & Bott, 2015), persistence (Le, Robbins, & 
Westrick, 2014), selection (Morley & Sekiguchi, 2007), and other organizational events 
(see Kristof-Brown et al., 2005 for a meta-analysis of 172 papers on person-organization, 
person-group, and person-supervisor fit).  
Although P-E fit interaction research has been studied in the social sciences 
literature for many decades, there remains great disparity in the way that P-E fit is 
conceptualized and/or operationalized in the literature (Edwards, 2008). This issue is 
often considered a function of the general complexity of the multiple variations of P-E fit 
and subsets of fit that theoretically occur within organizations (Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 
1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005).   
On the other hand, regulatory fit theory is analogous, yet conceptually and 
operationally distinct from extant models of P-E fit. Whereas, “P-E fit speaks to broader 
arrays of individuals’ dispositions (e.g., personality, values, attitudes, skills, interests, or 
goals), regulatory fit theory uniquely focuses on the match between individuals’ 
regulatory goals (which are dispositional or can be situationally primed) and their manner 
of goal pursuit (which can also be dispositional, rather than exclusively situational),” 
(Pai, Lee, & Jung, 2015: 10).  
In addition, it is generally assumed that P-E fit consistently shifts outcomes in a 
positive direction (Ostroff & Schulte, 2007; Pai et al., 2015). On the contrary, regulatory 
fit theorists note that regulatory fit does not always generate positive effects. Since 
regulatory fit has the effect of magnifying an individual’s motivation or strategy of goal 
pursuit (Grant-Halvorson & Higgins, 2013), positive behaviors have the potential to be 
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enhanced in positive outcomes, such as in the case of increased motivation, while certain 
negative actions might become even more negative, such as the potential for decreased 
motivation (Cesario et al., 2004; Pai et al., 2015). 
 
2.3.4 Regulatory Focus, Regulatory Fit, & Message Framing  
Regulatory fit theory has been used by scholars to investigate the interplay 
between an individual’s regulatory focus and the way in which content framing 
influences individual behavior. For example, research has suggested that the presence of 
certain information will be perceived and acted upon differently by individuals with 
differing regulatory foci (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). The presence of positive information 
is more salient to promotion focused individuals (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). These 
promotion focused individuals attempt to ensure hits and minimize errors of omission 
(e.g., attempt to minimize missing actual opportunities). This type of error, when an 
individual does not detect an opportunity when one exists, is classified as a type two error 
(Field, 2009).  
On the other hand, the presence or absence of negative information is more salient 
to prevention focused individuals (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). These individuals attempt 
to avoid erroneous actions, thereby minimizing errors of commission (e.g., attempt to 
minimize taking action based on misperceived opportunities). This type of error, when an 
individual does not recognize or act upon a valid opportunity when one exists, is 
classified as a type one error (Field, 2009). 
In terms of empirical findings, Appelt and Higgins (2010) investigated regulatory 
fit in relation to price negotiations. These authors found promotion focused agents were 
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more demanding under an eager condition (i.e., a condition that highlighted the 
importance of maximizing gains and achieving price maximization). In this condition, 
agents experienced a regulatory fit. On the other hand, when promotion focused agents 
were manipulated into a vigilant strategy (i.e., one that emphasized loss minimization and 
adherence to a minimum price), they were less demanding. This condition is known as a 
regulatory nonfit condition.  
 
2.3.5 Regulatory Focus, Regulatory Fit, & Entrepreneurship  
Over the last decade, entrepreneurship scholars have gradually augmented their 
traditional focus from macro-processes toward micro-processes that take place during 
new venture launches (Fatma, Mohamed, & Boudabouss, 2013). This progression toward 
an analysis of the behavioral foundations of entrepreneurship has resulted in a resurgence 
in attention toward many of the core ideas and theories from fields such as behavioral 
economics and social psychology (Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, & Weber, 2014; Fatma et al., 
2013).  
One of the first articles to link regulatory focus to entrepreneurship was Brockner 
et al.’s (2004) theoretical analysis. Brockner et al. (2004) argue that promotion focused 
entrepreneurs are superior in developing entrepreneurial ideas, but are more likely to 
pivot from these ideas by switching to alternative activities. With regard to resource 
acquisition and pitching, Brockner et al. (2004) argue that promotion and prevention 
focus are both critical for persuading external parties to support their ventures. Likewise, 
they argue that proving out the business model requires a combination of promotion and 
prevention modes. However, this work did not empirically test these propositions.  
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In terms of empirical work, McMullen & Shepherd (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2002) examined differences between nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and 
found that the chronic promotion focus of nascent entrepreneurs was significantly higher 
than that of non-entrepreneurs. With regard to entrepreneurial processes, scholarship has 
demonstrated a link between regulatory focus and creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001), 
intent to start a new venture (McMullen & Shepherd, 2002), entrepreneurial strategies 
(McMullen & Zahra, 2006), creative perseverance (Lam & Chiu, 2002), idea generation 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997), and focus (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999).  
Entrepreneur-level and firm-level outcomes are also of critical importance to 
entrepreneurship and strategy scholars. To this end, empirical findings have demonstrated 
the link between regulatory focus and revenue generated from frequent networking 
(Pollack, Forster, Johnson, Coy, & Molden, 2015), opportunity recognition (Tumasjan & 
Braun, 2012), and indirect effects on growth, and performance in dynamic environments 
(Hmieleski & Baron, 2008; Wallace, Little, Hill, & Ridge, 2010). Empirical and 
theoretical findings at the intersection of entrepreneurship and regulatory focus are 
displayed in Table 3 and Table 4.  
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Table 3: Entrepreneurship Relevant Promotion Focus Correlates 
Entrepreneurial Trait / Behavior Study Method Citations 
Confidence of growth expectations Theoretical Mickiewicz & Sauka (2011) 
Creativity Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Creativity by employees Survey  Wu et al. (2008) 
Dedication to venture in risky environment Experimental Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) 
Deviation from original business opportunity Archival & survey data Hmieleski & Baron (2008) 
Entrepreneurial experience Theoretical Podoynitsyna et al. (2012) 
Entrepreneurial intent Survey with entrepreneurs McMullen & Zahra (2006) 
Entrepreneurial optimism Survey with entrepreneurs Trevelyan (2014) 
Growth in dynamic environments (indirect) Archival & survey data Hmieleski & Baron (2008) 
Idea generation Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
  Experimental Crowe & Higgins (1997) 
Innovativeness of opportunities recognized Quasi-experimental Tumasjan & Braun (2012) 
Intent to start an independent new venture Survey with entrepreneurs McMullen & Shepherd (2002) 
Number of opportunities recognized Quasi-experimental Tumasjan & Braun (2012) 
Openness to change 5 studies  Liberman et al. (1999)  
Procuring resources Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Proving the business model Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Revenue generated from networking Survey with entrepreneurs Pollack et al. (2015) 
Riskier investment by groups Experiment with groups Florack & Hartman (2007) 
Utilizing visionary skills Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 









Entrepreneurial Trait / Behavior Study Method Citations 
Avoiding the sunk cost error 2 studies Higgins et al. (2001) 
Dedication to venture in low risk environment Experimental Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) 
Entrepreneurial intent Survey with entrepreneurs McMullen & Zahra (2006) 
Focus on and resuming an interrupted task 2 studies Liberman et al. (1999)  
Idea screening Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Implementing company vision Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Intention to act entrepreneurially Theoretical Fitzsimmons & Douglas (2011) 
Perseverance through creative obstacles 2 studies Lam & Chiu (2002) 
Procuring resources Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Proving the business model Theoretical Brockner et al. (2004) 
Risk aversion in group investments (no time 
pressure) 
Experiment with groups Florack & Hartman (2007) 
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CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this dissertation, I investigate how displays of regulatory focus by 
entrepreneurs can be an important indicator for external resource providers (e.g., 
investors, bankers, suppliers, providers of labor). Specifically, I argue that displays or 
signals of regulatory focus serve as an indicator of the way in which the entrepreneur 
intends to manage his or her firm in the future, ultimately impacting the entrepreneur’s 
likelihood of successfully acquiring resources.  
 
3.1 Promotion Focus & Resource Acquisition  
 
Despite the growing importance of regulatory focus as an indicator of strategic 
behaviors in individuals, there has been little consideration given to the role of regulatory 
focus at the firm or strategic levels. Moreover, there has been little attention paid to how 
CEO or entrepreneur displays of regulatory focus impact the subsequent actions of 
outside stakeholders. However, this area is a viable and important area of study 
(Gamache et al., 2015).  
 Since regulatory focus is a motivation-based characteristic that reflects 
preferences for strategic action as well as goal-striving (Gamache et al., 2015), I argue 
that regulatory focus is a particularly important signal that outsiders seek out and evaluate 
when making assessments about new venture intentions and probabilities of success. 
Although there has been very little work done at the firm level with regard to the 
influence of regulatory focus, there is a considerable body of work to draw on in order to 
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develop expedient hypotheses from the study of individuals in organizations, as detailed 
below.   
In terms of how promotion focus might be an influential characteristic in 
entrepreneurship at the individual entrepreneur level, Gorman et al. (2012) in their meta-
analyses demonstrated that promotion focus was positively associated with 
conscientiousness, self-esteem, and learning goal orientation. All of these characteristics 
have been linked to success in entrepreneurship (Ciuchta, Letwin, Stevenson, & 
McMahon, 2014; Wang, 2008; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005). Moreover, promotion 
focused individuals are less likely to experience emotions such as anxiety and 
acquiescence (Higgins et al., 1997), which could hinder entrepreneurial resilience in the 
early stages of launch. 
Displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs can be important indicators for 
external resource providers, because these displays of promotion focus are an indicator of 
the way in which the entrepreneur intends to manage and direct his or her firm in the 
future. In this way, the external resource provider may develop assumptions about the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur. For instance, the external resource provider may 
consider the entrepreneur as highly capable of providing superior investment returns 
because they believe that promotion displays indicate high potential for entrepreneurial 
success due to the personality link to conscientiousness, self-esteem, or learning goal 
orientation (Gorman et al., 2012). Moreover, promotion displays may highlight to the 
external resource provider that an entrepreneur is likely to take an eager approach to 
venture growth, thus potentially allowing for above average returns, a common 
prerequisite of many early stage deals (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). 
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Early stage firms tend to lack valuable strategic resources (Zott & Huy, 2007). 
Thus, in the absence of these resources, nascent entrepreneurs may signal other details 
about their strategic plans such as their eagerness for growth or their attention toward 
achievement via promotion signals. Such promotion signals may allow resource 
providers to differentiate between entrepreneurs who are likely able or unable to 
overcome the many liabilities of newness associated with the early stages of 
entrepreneurship (Stinchcombe, 1965). These promotion focused signals have the 
potential to alter investment behaviors as these signals convey important details about the 
strategic intentions of these nascent firms.  
In summary, new venture opportunities tend to facilitate the possibility of large 
potential investment returns that are sought by early stage external resource providers 
(Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). Accordingly, I argue that displays which reveal eager 
strategic intentions and a focus on achievement have the potential to be particularly 
valuable to early stage resource providers. Ultimately, these displays are likely to 
increase resource acquisition success for the firm. Formally, I hypothesize:  
H1a: There is a positive relationship between displays of promotion focus and 
resource acquisition. 
 
3.2 Prevention Focus & Resource Acquisition  
 
Although the two regulatory focus strategies are very different in terms of their 
procedures and focus, neither strategy should be considered superior a priori, as their 
respective efficiency is contingent on the nature of the task at hand (Grant-Halvorson & 
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Higgins, 2013). In the context of new ventures, both a promotion focus and a prevention 
focus are necessary for many entrepreneurial processes (Brockner et al., 2004). For 
instance, the idea generation and creative processes rely on a promotion focus (Brockner 
et al., 2004; Friedman & Förster, 2001), while the completing due diligence, idea 
screening, and task focus rely on a prevention focus (Brockner et al., 2004; Liberman et 
al., 1999).  
I follow extant theoretical research (Brockner et al., 2004) in developing my 
hypotheses to suggest that both promotion and prevention orientations are important 
predictors of new venture funding performance. A prevention focus could be of particular 
relevance to new venture launch and develop stages as prevention focused individuals are 
more likely to regain focus in order to complete interrupted tasks (Liberman et al., 1999), 
be capable of implementing the vision of the company (Brockner et al., 2004), avoid sunk 
cost errors (Higgins et al., 2001), and persevere in the face of creative obstacles (Lam & 
Chiu, 2002). Thus, prevention focus has the potential to be an effective regulatory mode 
for early stage entrepreneurs. Likewise, then, external resource providers could likely be 
interested in seeking out entrepreneurs with prevention focused dispositions as this self-
regulation strategy could enhance long-term firm value for these external resource 
providers. Thus, I hypothesize:  
  
H1b: There is a positive relationship between displays of prevention focus and 
resource acquisition.  
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3.3 Regulatory Fit Theory & Resource Acquisition   
 
External resource providers hold implicit and subjectively based mental models 
with regard to the factors that impact resource allocation (Chen et al., 2009). These 
mental models serve as heuristics that external resource providers use to determine their 
own resource allocation behaviors (Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1999). In new ventures, ambiguity and uncertainty are ubiquitous and claims 
made by entrepreneurs cannot always be easily validated (Teece, 1996). Thus, external 
resource providers tend to rely on subjective evaluations of entrepreneurs (Baron, 
Markman, & Bollinger, 2006). Moreover, resource providers often make resource 
allocation decisions with imperfect information based on their “gut feelings” about the 
entrepreneur, the management team, and the interpersonal chemistry between the 
entrepreneur and the external resource provider.    
Prior research suggests that interpersonal chemistry between entrepreneurs and 
external resource providers is a crucial factor that facilitates resource allocation (Chen et 
al., 2009; Riquelme & Watson, 2002). In this way, external resource providers either 
consciously or unconsciously prefer to invest in entrepreneurs when there is a high 
congruence between the external resource provider’s own cognitive schemas and the 
entrepreneur’s displayed schemas (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006; Riquelme 
& Watson, 2002). Franke et al. (2006) highlight that fit between entrepreneur and 
external resource provider perceptions may be a vital yet under-studied factor in new 
venture funding success. Specifically, using a conjoint analysis, Franke et al. (2006) find 
that early stage external resource providers tend to favor founder teams that are similar to 
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themselves. Whether or not this preference is active or rather an implicit bias is yet to be 
determined. In either case, recent work from Lungeanu and Zajac (2016) finds firm and 
investment performance benefits can result from perceptual matches between firms and 
external resource providers in the form of time horizons, venture stage, and industry. 
I argue herein, that the theoretical and empirical work noted above with regard to 
interpersonal external resource provider cognitions can be advanced by uniting it with a 
related and well established stream of work in the self-regulation literature. In the self-
regulation literature, the theory of regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000b) explicates the 
importance of matching high levels of regulatory focus to goal pursuit behaviors. This 
theory is concerned with analyzing the alignment between an individual’s regulatory 
orientation (e.g., promotion or prevention focus) and the manner in which that individual 
is actively pursuing his or her goals (Cesario et al., 2008). A regulatory fit, “occurs when 
individuals pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their current regulatory state” (Idson et 
al., 2004: 927). For example, in a new venture context, a task such as idea brainstorming 
about the name of a new product line would match a high promotion focus because it 
emphasizes strategic eagerness and advancement. However, this brainstorming task 
around a new product launch would not be a good match with a high prevention focus as 
it is at odds with considerations for strategic vigilance (Brockner et al., 2004; Idson et al., 
2004). 
In terms of the displays sent in entrepreneurial pitches, the self-regulation 
literature described above is relevant in several respects with regard to display detection 
by external evaluators (Baron, 2004). Specifically, scholarship suggests that when 
individuals have a dominant promotion focus they are more likely to recognize a 
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promotion stimulus when it is present. In contrast, the literature also suggests that when 
individuals are guided by a prevention focus, they are more likely to recognize prevention 
stimuli (Lee & Aaker, 2004; Yi & Baumgartner, 2009). From a regulatory fit perspective, 
the differential recognition of stimuli by external evaluators has several implications for 
the behaviors of those evaluators.  
Previous work in this area finds that a regulatory fit increases motivational 
intensity (Higgins et al., 2003; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). Additional research 
extending this work demonstrated that, due to its effect on motivational intensity, 
regulatory fit makes anticipated positive mental states with regard to potential positive 
outcomes even more positive, and anticipated negative mental states with regard to 
potential negative outcomes even more negative (Idson et al., 2004). Moreover, real 
investment benefits have been demonstrated to arise from firm and private equity investor 
alignment across a sample of 1,194 ventures (Lungeanu & Zajac, 2016).   
These findings have important implications for related theoretical development of 
regulatory fit theory in the resource acquisition context. Specifically, it follows that 
entrepreneur signals and external resource provider disposition that have the 
characteristics of a high regulatory fit will amplify resource acquisition prospects. This 
association is likely to occur whether or not regulatory fit is objective or merely 
perceptual in the minds of the external resource provider. This occurs because external 
resource providers rely on their perceptions of regulatory fit vis-à-vis their own 
regulatory disposition and the entrepreneur’s displays about goals and the strategic means 
that the entrepreneur plans to use in managing the firm (Scholer & Higgins, 2008). Thus, 
whether or not the entrepreneur’s own regulatory focus disposition is a purely objective 
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match with the external resource provider’s disposition is less germane with regard to 
actionable investment outcomes. Rather, what I analyze herein is the regulatory fit 
between external resource provider’s regulatory focus and the displays of regulatory 
focus sent by the entrepreneur in the pitch process. Since regulatory focus influences how 
individuals view strategic opportunities (Gamache et al., 2015), regulatory focus theory 
provides an effective and specific framework to simultaneously study the interactive role 
of resource provider dispositions and entrepreneur displays on resource acquisition.  
 I propose that regulatory fit will increase the resource provider’s positive 
evaluation of investment opportunities, thereby strengthening resource allocation 
intentions. Although this contention theoretically extends the arguments of Brockner et 
al. (2004), it has not been empirically tested. I expect that high regulatory fit between 
displays of regulatory focus sent in a pitch setting and the resource provider’s regulatory 
focus will increase resource acquisition. In other words, when an external resource 
provider’s own cognitive schema is dominated by a promotion focus and the external 
resource provider observes promotion focused displays by an entrepreneur, the external 
resource provider is expected to be more willing to provide resources. Formally, I 
hypothesize:  
H2a: The promotion focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the 
relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource acquisition; such 
that when the potential resource provider’s promotion focus is high, resource 




Likewise, when there is an alignment between the entrepreneur’s displays of 
prevention focus and an external resource provider’s prevention focused schema, a high 
regulatory match is derived. Thus, such a scenario will yield similar outcomes in terms of 
resource allocation intentions. Although on the surface a crowdfunding narrative that is 
dominated by displays of prevention focus might seem discretely dissimilar with respect 
to its likelihood of attracting funding than one dominated by promotion displays, I argue 
that a high match between entrepreneur regulatory focus displays and external resource 
provider regulatory focus is the key factor which underlies a willingness to provide 
resources.  
As noted previously, the signals sent in entrepreneurial pitches are likely received 
and recognized idiosyncratically by external evaluators based on several individual 
differences including their own dominant self-regulatory modes (Baron, 2004). In terms 
of prevention focus, the literature suggests that when individuals are guided by a 
prevention focus, they are more likely to recognize prevention stimuli (Yi & 
Baumgartner, 2009). Thus, I expect that when the external resource provider’s own 
cognitive schema is dominated by a prevention focus, and he or she observes prevention 
focused displays displayed by the entrepreneur, the external resource provider will be 
more willing to provide resources. Formally, I hypothesize: 
H2b: The prevention focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the 
relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource acquisition; such 
that when the potential resource provider’s prevention focus is high, resource 
acquisition will be increasingly positive. 
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3.4 Regulatory Misfit & Resource Acquisition  
 Regulatory fit occurs when an individual’s regulatory focus and the way in which 
a message is framed are aligned. When in alignment a regulatory fit ensues. For example, 
when a message is framed with high positive information, promotion focused individuals 
will experience a regulatory fit, or feel right about this message (Higgins, 2005). When 
an actor feels right, they are more likely to undertake the pursuit of their strategic goals 
through their preferred regulatory mode.  
 In contrast, when the strategic nature of the means for attaining a goal is not in 
alignment with an individual’s dominant regulatory focus, cognitive performance can be 
impaired (Higgins, 1997; Tang, 2009). Moreover, an individual’s regulatory focus 
impacts the types of outcomes that are salient to individuals (Brockner et al., 2004). Thus, 
individuals are less likely to notice signals that are misaligned with their own regulatory 
focus disposition. For example, an individual that is high in promotion focus is less likely 
to notice an anti-smoking marketing message about the negative social consequences of 
smoking (Zhao & Pechmann, 2007). When combining the impact of saliency (Brockner 
et al., 2004) and the feeling right effect (Higgins, 2005) with regard to predictions about 
individual behaviors, regulatory fit theory leads scholars to believe that regulatory misfit 
will likely weaken resource allocation intentions. Thus, I hypothesize the following:   
H3a: The promotion focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the 
relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource acquisition; such 
that when the potential resource provider’s promotion focus is high, resource 




Likewise, regulatory misfit for prevention focused individuals should work in a similar 
manner. That is, I expect that when the external resource provider is high in prevention 
focus, signals of promotion focus will attenuate the external resource provider’s 
willingness to provide resources. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H3b: The prevention focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the 
relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource acquisition; such 
that when the potential resource provider’s prevention focus is high, resource 
acquisition will be increasingly negative.  
 










CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY & RESULTS 
4.1 Methodological Overview 
  In testing my hypotheses, I undertook two empirical studies. For study one, I 
conducted a field study using an archival crowdfunding dataset. This dataset consisted of 
crowdfunding narratives developed by entrepreneurs. The narratives were publically 
posted directly by each entrepreneur to a popular internet crowdfunding platform, 
kickstarter.com. In accordance with the explicitly stated terms of the crowdfunding 
platform, I can only assume that each entrepreneur posted these narratives in order to 
convey information to potential investors in an effort to facilitate the acquisition of 
resources for their venture. I describe the details of these narratives in more detail in the 
section below. Through the use of such narratives - which vary in their use of promotion 
and prevention displays - I was able to test the main effect hypotheses (H1a, H1b). H1a & 
H1b make predictions about the directional effects of promotion and prevention displays 
on funding performance.  
  Next, I undertook a second study to address certain limitations of the Study One 
archival data set. The archival crowdfunding dataset utilized in Study One has many 
advantages, including its ability to deliver externally valid results to the content domain. 
However, one challenge with the archival crowdfunding dataset is that it obscures 
individual-level resource provider characteristics, thereby eliminating the possibility to 
observe the interplay of the external resource provider’s regulatory focus and the 
entrepreneur’s displays of regulatory focus (i.e., regulatory fit) and the influence of these 
variables on resource acquisition. Thus, in order to go further and assess the hypothesized 
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regulatory fit influences, I developed a quasi-experimental between participant design in 
Study Two and used an online survey instrument to measure the chronic regulatory focus 
of the participants. Using this approach, I tested how regulatory fit (H2a, H2b) and 
regulatory misfit (H3a, H3b) between the external resource provider’s regulatory focus 
and the regulatory focus displays by entrepreneurs either amplified or attenuated the 
regulatory focus signal and resource acquisition relationship.  
4.2 Study One 
4.2.1 Study One Procedure  
For the purposes of examining the role of regulatory focus displays on 
crowdfunding performance, I analyzed a random sample of crowdfunding narratives from 
the crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter. The Kickstarter platform has become a 
significant source of funding for emerging organizations, amassing more than $2.1 billion 
from over 25 million investments over 86,407 projects since its inception (Kickstarter, 
2015). Each individual campaign is hosted directly on the website and its content is 
contained on a single webpage. The webpage typically contains a textual narrative and 
video pitch describing the entrepreneurial founders, the scope of the opportunity, the 
prospects for the project, and the planned actions of the founders to capitalize on the 
opportunity.   
To analyze these entrepreneurs’ video and textual narratives, I conducted a 
content analysis of the campaign narratives (e.g., Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005; Smith & 
Taffler, 2000). More specifically, I used a computer-aided text analysis approach (e.g., 
Boling, Pieper, & Covin, 2015; Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2014; McKenny, 
Short, & Payne, 2013). Computer-aided text analysis uses textual narratives to measure 
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the frequency of variables based on the presence of words and word families used in the 
narratives. I describe this procedure in more detail below with regard to the promotion 
and prevention focused words and word families.   
Analysis of publicly available content has emerged as a viable and useful 
methodological technique for various questions in the management literature (Marcel, 
Barr, & Duhaime, 2010; Moss et al., 2015; Rhee & Fiss, 2014). In the strategic 
management literature, scholars have used CEO shareholder letters to capture proximal 
measures of CEO cognitions, attention, and characteristics (e.g., Kaplan, 2008). In this 
study, I leverage this approach for a new form of publicly available content; the 
crowdfunding campaign. 
 
4.2.2 Study One Sample 
For Study One, I used a sample of 900 crowdfunding campaigns randomly drawn 
from a publicly available listing of 45,815 crowdfunding campaigns from the Kickstarter 
platform (Mollick, 2014). Using this sample to test my hypotheses was advantageous for 
several reasons. First, although the dataset does not contain the entire population of 
crowdfunding campaigns, it does contain approximately 91% of the campaigns posted 
publicly on Kickstarter over a three year period ending June 2, 2012. Second, the dataset 
is comparable to the sampling timeframes of previously conducted crowdfunding studies 
(e.g., Mollick, 2014), and thus the dataset will allow me to discuss my results in the 




4.2.3 Study One Measures  
4.2.3.1 Dependent Variable: Resource Acquisition  
  On crowdfunding platforms, entrepreneurs set a funding target at the beginning of 
the campaign with regard to the targeted financial resources they seek to acquire. Funders 
then begin to commit capital to the campaign on a rolling basis. These funds are then held 
in trust by the crowdfunding platform until the end of the crowdfunding campaign. If the 
funding target is not completely obtained prior to the last day of the predetermined 
campaign timeframe, then the funders are refunded their entire investment amount and 
the entrepreneur receives no funds. This is known as the all or nothing funding model. In 
the all or nothing funding model, resource acquisition is dependent upon fully reaching 
one’s crowdfunding target. Meeting this all or nothing funding target is the core and most 
salient crowdfunding resource acquisition outcome (Anglin et al., 2015; Mollick, 2014).  
Following extant literature (Mollick, 2014), I created a dichotomous resource 
acquisition variable based on the success of the campaign with outcome coded as 
“1”when the funding target was obtained by the entrepreneur and as “0” when the target 
was not obtained. The use of a dichotomous resource acquisition variable is advantageous 
as it allows for theoretical comparability with extant new venture finance research in 
other contexts that use a similar dichotomous resource acquisition dependent variable 
(e.g., Batjargal, 2007).  
 
4.2.3.2 Independent Variables: Promotion and Prevention Focus Displays  
  Using the Study One dataset, I measured displays of promotion and prevention 
focus in both textual and video crowdfunding narratives. Computer-aided textual analysis 
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allowed me to measure the presence of promotion and prevention focused words and 
word families found in the various text and video pitch narratives.  
 To measure displays of promotion and prevention focus I developed and utilized 
an independently validated CATA measure by following guidelines from Short et 
al.(2010) and McKenny et al. (2013). The process included the following general phases: 
defining the construct and dimensionality, generating a deductive word list, generating an 
inductive word list, refining the initial word list using expert raters, and selecting a 
sample from which to assess predictive validity. In the initial deductive word list 
generation stage, researchers are advised to develop an exhaustive list of synonyms using 
an existing listing of similar words and phrases. This can be achieved by using Rodale’s 
(1978) The Synonym Finder, for example (see Short et al., 2010).  
When developing word lists, examining existing scales can provide researchers 
with an efficient way to identify words and phrases that might be appropriate for 
inclusion in the CATA measure (Short et al., 2010). Thus, to supplement the deductive 
word list generation approach, I also drew upon recent literature which measured 
regulatory focus words in CEO shareholder letters (Gamache et al., 2015). While 
examining previous scales provides a suitable starting point, previous scales should not 
be relied upon in isolation because such procedures are likely to result in word lists that 
are not fully representative of the construct domain (Short et al., 2010). In addition, 
recent critics of existing promotion and prevention focus scales (e.g., Summerville & 
Roese, 2008) argue that many existing promotion and prevention measures do not 
adequately capture the entire domain of the theoretical constructs as theorized by Higgins 
(1997). To avoid a similar fate, my CATA dictionary development was designed to be 
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more expansive than previous scale development efforts from inception. Specifically, I 
wanted to ensure that the entire domain would be included for each construct. To achieve 
this, I adopted the broadest possible conceptualization of both the promotion and 
prevention domains available in the literature by following prior work from Neubert et al. 
(2008). As such, in addition to the deductive and inductive word lists generated using 
Neubert et al.’s (2008) expansive conceptualizations of promotion and prevention focus 
and CATA best practices (see Short et al., 2010), all the words in the Gamache et al. 
(2015) dictionaries were also included in my initial phase one comprehensive word list. 
After the initial word list was developed, each word was then assessed and rated 
by two external raters to determine if each word fell within the construct domain of 
promotion or prevention focus. Expert raters were provided with definitions of promotion 
focus and prevention focus derived from existing literature (Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 
2001; Neubert, Wu, & Roberts, 2013). Interrater reliability for the promotion word list 
was 83.48%, while the interrater reliability for the prevention word list was 87.96%. To 
ensure that no theoretically relevant words were missing from the final dictionaries, 
additional recommended words and rating discrepancies were considered in a second 
round of word ratings by the expert judges. Words were only added at this stage if 100% 
agreement was reached between the judges.  
This exhaustive procedure revealed numerous additional words and phrases 
beyond those found in the Gamache et al. (2015) dictionary that were deemed 
theoretically meaningful to the domain of regulatory focus as assessed by expert raters in 
the subsequent stages of the CATA measurement development process. As such, the 
multi-stage dictionary development process used in this dissertation, following best 
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practices from Short et al. (2010) and McKenny et al. (2013), extends previous work by 
putting forth a more comprehensive overall CATA measure for both the promotion 
domain and the prevention domain.  
Examples of words and phrases that were included in the promotion dictionary 
include “advancement”, “dream”, “eager”, “ideal”, “game changer”, and “maximum 
potential.” Table 13 provides the full dictionary for this CATA measure. Table 15 
illustrates the use of language associated with each dictionary in the sample of narratives 
used in this study. Examples of words that were included in the prevention dictionary 
include “careful”, “conservatively”, “duty”, “obligation”, “prudently”, and “rainy day 
fund.” Table 14 provides the full dictionary for this CATA measure. Table 15 illustrates 
the use of language associated with each dictionary in the sample of narratives used in 
this study. 
4.2.3.3 Control Variables:  
  To account for possible alternative explanations, I included several control 
variables in the analysis. Control variables commonly included in crowdfunding research 
include campaign duration, funding target, campaign category, and organizational and 
project quality measures (Allison et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014).  
Campaign duration: On Kickstarter, the platform used in this analysis, campaigns 
vary from 1 to 60 days as determined by the entrepreneur. Previous work has suggested 
that campaign duration can impact funding outcomes (Mollick, 2014). Thus, I controlled 
for campaign duration following Mollick (2014) by calculating the number of days from 




Funding target: The funding target amount for the campaign is self-selected by 
the entrepreneur. There are a variety of factors that might impact the targeted funding 
amount that each entrepreneur selects. Overall, however founders have an incentive to set 
realistic and attainable campaign goals because their success and failure in the campaign 
are ultimately contingent upon reaching the funding target that they had set at the 
beginning of the campaign. Recent work has revealed that, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
campaign funding target, the less likely it is that the campaign will be funded (Allison et 
al., 2013). Thus, I controlled for funding target (logged, in US dollars). 
Organizational & project quality. Since I was specifically interested in assessing 
the impact of promotion and prevention focused language, the underlying organizational 
or project quality are important controls to include in this analysis. To control for these 
effects, I created four independent measures of organization and project quality. First, a 
platform-specific project quality variable – Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick – was 
created to identify whether the campaign was vetted and whether it was featured directly 
on the platform itself. Kickstarter occasionally features certain campaigns by designating 
them as staff picks. Staff picks have a greater likelihood of being displayed on the 
platform’s landing page and also feature a staff pick logo. This logo is typically found in 
the upper corner of the campaign narrative and clearly identifies the campaign as a staff 
pick. A sample of a campaign page that has been designated as a staff pick is displayed as 
Figure 4. Being selected as a staff pick is a sign of organizational quality as vetted by the 
crowdfunding platform staff directly and thus represents a platform specific 
operationalization of organizational quality derived from archival data.  
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To ensure that organizational and project quality was sufficiently accounted for, I 
included three additional organizational quality controls by using Anglin et al. (2015) 
validated three dimensional organizational quality CATA measure. This measure 
differentiates and codes each narrative for three related types of organizational quality 
(i.e., high-tech organizations, organizations with proprietary products or services, and 
organizations that have completed prototype development). These three organizational 
quality sub-types are recognized in the literature as key criteria and were originally put 
forth  by MacMillan, Siegel, and Narasimha (1986) in their classic study in which the 
authors identified the key criteria used by investors when assessing new venture 
opportunities. Each dimension has its own CATA dictionary and each firm narrative was 
analyzed along each dimension with the Cat Scanner software program (McKenny & 
Short, 2012). 
The high-tech dimension identifies whether or not the organization is classified as 
or described as high-tech. The word list includes terms such as “cybernetics”, “high-
tech”, “nanotechnology”, and “technology.” The original word list was developed by 
Anglin et al.(2015) by adapting descriptive words and phrases from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Level-1 high technology industries list (Heckler, 2005) and by broadly 
following Short et al.’s (2010) deductive/inductive process for creating word lists. This 
variable appears in my analysis as Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech.  
The second dimension, proprietary, identifies whether or not the organization’s 
products or services are classified as or described as proprietary and/or whether or not 
they are described as otherwise being protected or protectable. This dimension was also 
developed by Anglin et al. (2015) by adapting the words and phrases from the Glossary 
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of Intellectual Property Terms published by the U.S. Department of State (U.S 
Department of State & U.S. Department of State, 2008). The authors broadly followed 
Short et al.’s (2010) deductive/inductive process. The final word list includes terms such 
as “patent”, “brand”, and “copyright.” This variable appears in my analysis as Org. 
Quality Control 4: Prototyped. The final organizational quality dimension, prototyped, 
identifies whether or not the organization’s product or service is classified as or described 
as being developed to the point of a functioning prototype. This word list was also 
developed by Anglin et al.(2015) in accordance with Short et al.’s (2010) 
deductive/inductive best practices for CATA word list development. The final word list 
includes terms such as “archetype”, “model”, and “prototype.” ” This variable appears in 
my analysis as Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped. 
Project category: Project category is analogous to the common industry control in 
much strategy research. Industry classification has been demonstrated to have a 
significant effect on firm-level outcomes (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997). In a similar 
vein, project category in crowdfunding has been shown to influence resource acquisition 
outcomes for crowdfunding firms (Allison et al., 2015, 2013). I operationalized the 
project category variable by following procedures used by Mollick (2014) in which 
eleven internal Kickstarter project category were dummy coded; art, design, fashion, 
food, games, music, photography, publishing, technology, theater, and video & film. 
Table 8 displays each of these categories and their effects on resource acquisition.  
Year: The data utilized in this study spans a time period from 2009 to 2012. To 
control for the effect of year on the outcome variable of interest, dummy coded control 
variables were created and entered into the model. The purpose of these dummy coded 
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variables was to account for the effects of general economic trends or stochastic events 
that might occur within the time period of the sample. Such a control follows extant work 
in strategic management (e.g., Rumelt, 1991; Sharp, Bergh, & Li, 2013) and 
entrepreneurship literatures (e.g., Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; George, 2005). 
 
4.2.4 Study One Results   
4.2.4.1 Study One statistical procedures 
   Study One was conducted to test the direct effect of regulatory focus displays on 
resource acquisition. Count variables for promotion focus displays and prevention focus 
displays were calculated for both the textual and video narratives for each campaign in 
the sample using the CATA software program CAT Scanner (McKenny & Short, 2012). 
CAT Scanner is a free dictionary-based CATA tool for Windows-based computers that 
allows researchers to quickly produce count variables for their constructs of interest. The 
technique has been used in numerous academic literatures to unobtrusively develop count 
measures for predefined dictionaries with high reliability (McKenny, 2015). As in 
previous work (e.g., Allison et al., 2015, 2013; Mousa, Wales, & Harper, 2015), I used an 
absolute count variable rather than a narrative word-length proportional operationalize for 
all CATA-based variables. I analyzed the Study One sample narratives using CAT 
Scanner software. The resulting output was a data file that had a discrete value assigned 





4.2.4.2 Study One descriptive statistics 
Table 6 and Table 7 display the descriptive statistics, including means and 
standard deviations for Study One. In the Study One sample, the mean funding target was 
USD $9,556.10 with a mean total funding of USD $4,421.86 obtained at the end of the 
average campaign. The mean crowdfunding campaign duration was 39.9 days. In terms 
of quality control variables, approximately 12% of the campaigns were featured as staff 
picks, 22%, 31%, and 43% of the campaigns were identified through the CATA control 
measures as being high-tech, having proprietary intellectual property, or having 
developed a prototype in that order. With regard to the use of promotion and prevention 
focused language in the crowdfunding pitches, promotion focus displays appear to be 
used more often by entrepreneurs. The mean number of promotion focused displays was 
4.3, while the mean score of prevention focused displays was 2.3.  
Fifty-one percent (51%) of campaigns were successful in terms of all or nothing 
resource acquisition success. The majority of crowdfunding campaigns that were 
successfully funded tended to be funded just slightly beyond the targeted funding levels 
that they had set. However, of the firms that successfully exceeded their funding target, 
41% exceeded their goal by more than 20% (overall 20.8% of total campaigns in the 
sample exceeded their goals by more than 20%). This finding is consistent with the 
published statistics from Kickstarter - the crowdfunding platform where the sample 
originated. Specifically, in 2015, Kickstarter revealed that approximately 20% of 
entrepreneurs that utilize their platform to raise capital exceed their goal by 20% 
(Kickstarter, 2015). That is not to say that there were not some cases in the dataset that 
were funded well beyond their targeted levels. The most successful campaigns exceeded 
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their targeted goals by 77.5 times, 13.12 times, 6.6 times, and 6.4 times respectively.  
 
4.2.4.3 Study One hypothesis tests  
To test the direct effect hypotheses (H1a & H1b), I conducted a logistic regression 
analysis. Logistic regression was used because resource acquisition success on 
Kickstarter  has a dichotomous resource acquisition outcome (Mollick, 2014). That is to 
say, entrepreneurs only receive funds if the funding target is obtained in its entirety. This 
is referred to as the all or nothing funding model. If the funding target is not met prior to 
the last day of the campaign timeframe, then the funds received by Kickstarter are 
subsequently returned to the funders, and the entrepreneur receives no funds.  
Hypothesis 1a proposed that displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs would 
be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant 
(β = 0.04; p < 0.05) and thus hypothesis 1a was supported. Hypothesis 1b proposed that 
displays of prevention focus by entrepreneurs would be positively related to resource 
acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant (β = 0.09; p < 0.01) and thus 
hypothesis 1b was supported. Table 8 presents the results of the Study One regression 
analysis.  
 
4.2.4.4 Study One robustness tests  
To test the robustness of the logistic regression analysis findings, I retested the 
hypothesized relationships using a secondary dependent variable and an alternative 
statistical analysis. In addition to being operationalized as dichotomous funding success, 
62 
 
resource acquisition could also be operationalized as total funding raised (Ahlers et al., 
2015). Total funding raised is a continuous variable, and, as such, I used ordinary least 
squares regression following Ahlers et al. (2015).  
Hypothesis 1a proposed that displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs would 
be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant 
(β = 0.05; p < 0.01) and thus Hypothesis 1a was supported using this alternative 
dependent variable. Hypothesis 1b proposed that displays of prevention focus by 
entrepreneurs would be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was 
positive and significant (β = 0.10; p < 0.01) and thus hypothesis 1a supported using this 
alternative dependent variable. Table 8 presents the results of the analysis.  
 
4.2.4.5 Study One post-hoc analysis  
To assess if the mean difference between promotion focused displays and 
prevention focused displays was statistically significant I conducted a one-sample t-test 
comparing the mean use of promotion focused displays ( x̅ = 4.30, s.d.= 5.28) with the 
mean use of prevention focused displays ( x̅ = 2.30, s.d.= 2.90). The test statistic was 
significant (t = 11.30; p < 0.01) and the 95% confidence interval excluded zero. Thus, the 
post-hoc analysis to determine if promotion focused displays are more likely to be used 





4.2.5 Study One Discussion  
The primary goal of Study One was to analyze whether or not displays of 
promotion focus and prevention focus influence the acquisition of resources in the new 
venture pitch process. Since acquiring resources is a paramount goal, and one that is 
critical to the existence and long-term viability of new firms (George, 2005), an 
understanding of the antecedents of firm resource acquisition has become a major area of 
research for entrepreneurship and strategic management scholars (e.g., Maxwell & 
Lévesque, 2011; Moss et al., 2015; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
Moreover, the new venture launch process is characterized by ambiguity. As a 
result the archetype entrepreneur is often described or envisioned as an individual 
intently focused on exploiting dynamically shifting environments and producing novel, 
innovative, or unusual solutions to problems which are often ill-defined (i.e., embodying 
a kind of promotion focused demeanor). Moreover, a promotion focused strategy has 
been shown to allow individuals to accomplish a greater quantity of work more quickly 
(Wallace & Chen, 2006), and individuals with a promotion focus have been shown to be 
more engaged and focused on desirable economic and growth outcomes (Johnson & 
Chang, 2008).  
Based on such findings, it would be no stretch to expect that displays of 
promotion focus are likely to be valued highly by investors and thus to be more likely to 
effectively garner early-stage resources. Moreover, one might also expect that, given this 
resource acquisition relationship, entrepreneurs would more commonly attempt to display 
promotion focused signals relative to prevention focused signals. Indeed, our findings 
confirm this. The mean scores in Study One revealed that promotion focus displays were 
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more commonly used relative to prevention focus displays by entrepreneurs in the 
sample. Given that the vast majority of the entrepreneurship popular press content and 
entrepreneurship textbooks tend to celebrate entrepreneurs that embody a promotion 
focused “game-changing” type of demeanor this is not surprising. What may be more 
surprising from the Study One results, however, is that, although promotion focused 
displays were much more commonly used by entrepreneurs, both promotion and 
prevention focused displays significantly predicted resource acquisition. 
Thus, it appears that both promotion and prevention focused displays can 
effectively garner resources. These results, therefore, bring an additional question to the 
forefront. Specifically, if both promotion and prevention focus displays effectively result 
in enhancing an entrepreneur’s likelihood of garnering resources, under what conditions 
might these displays be differentially impactful, and to which resource providers might 
these displays matter more? Study Two was designed to attempt to answer precisely these 
questions.  
4.3 Study Two 
  Study Two builds upon the findings of Study One and addresses certain 
limitations of the Study One dataset. Specifically, Study Two allows for the direct 
observation and analysis of regulatory fit between external resource provider regulatory 
focus and the entrepreneur’s displays of regulatory focus by using a quasi-experimental 
approach and a simulated crowdfunding platform. This study contributes to the literature 
by allowing for the reconciliation of the regulatory focus and regulatory fit literature with 
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the emerging literature stream that investigates the micro-social foundations of resource 
acquisition in the new venture context.  
 
4.3.1 Study Two Procedure  
Study Two analyzes funding mechanisms at the external resource provider level. 
While Study One was useful for determining direct signaling relationships in the field 
using an archival crowdfunding dataset, Study Two goes further and assesses external 
resource provider regulatory focus at the micro-level. Thus, Study Two can be used to 
investigate the moderating predictions. To do this, I developed a between participants 
quasi-experimental design to assess regulatory fit between the regulatory focus displays 
embedded in the crowdfunding narratives and the external resource provider’s chronic 
regulatory focus. Consistent with prior regulatory fit literature in other domains, when 
there was a high regulatory fit I expected resource acquisition likelihood would be 
increasingly positive.   
In Study Two, participants were directed to an online survey instrument using the 
Qualtrics platform. Upon entering the survey, participants were thanked for their 
voluntary participation and shown the required IRB explanations of the research. Next, 
participants were asked to complete a survey in which the primary purpose was to 
measure chronic regulatory focus using validated measures. For each measure, items 
were randomized to reduce any potential ordering effects. This process was then followed 
by a filler task. The survey instructions then briefly outlined the research setting and 
upcoming task. Table 5 displays the survey flow and specific messages that the 
participants viewed.  
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Next, participants were directed to click a link to open what was described to 
them as a beta version of a crowdfunding website. Specifically, participants were directed 
to www.crowdfundinvest.biz, a temporary website that was set up by the author of this 
dissertation to resemble a crowdfunding website. Once participants arrived at the website 
they viewed a short business pitch including a video, textual narrative, and related 
information that one might expect to see on a crowdfunding website. A print screen of the 
experimental stimuli is presented as Appendix J. To ensure that the participants viewed 
the experimental stimuli in full, a JavaScript code was written into the Qualtrics survey 
that would not allow the participants to advance to the next stage of the survey until the 
external crowdfunding website was visited and the video runtime was elapsed in full. 
This procedure eliminated any concern that participants might proceed through the 
survey without viewing the experimental stimuli.  
The experimental randomized factorial between-participants design involved a 
manipulation along the regulatory focus dimension with regard to textual and video 
signals conveyed in the pitch. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to either 
a promotion display or a prevention display condition. Participants then viewed and read 
two identical business pitches that diverged only along the dimension of promotion or 
prevention focused displays provided by the entrepreneur. The general business pitch was 
adapted from an actual crowdfunding pitch that had previously been posted on a popular 
crowdfunding website. The pitch featured an identical narrative with an identical video 
presentation. The only difference between the two conditions was the use of certain 
promotion or prevention focused words in the textual displays and in the voice-over of 
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the video presentation. The two divergent conditions of the experimental stimuli are 
presented in Appendix J. 
In both conditions, the recorded video voice-over was pitched by the same 
individual: a former entrepreneur with previous business pitching experience. Both 
pitches were three minutes and nine seconds long. After participants viewed the video 
and the crowdfunding page, they were redirected back to the survey to complete 
additional questions regarding outcome variables, controls, and demographics.   
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Thank you for participating in this survey 
 
click NEXT to continue 
 
 




You are being invited to take part in a research study being conducted at the UCF 
Department of Management. Participation in this study is voluntary. You must be 
20 years of age or older to participate. There are no right or wrong answers; we are 
simply interested in your viewpoint. You may choose not to participate. 
 
All of the responses will be held in strict confidence; no one other than the researchers 
will see your individual survey. All data for this survey will be collected through a 
secured website, and all data will be stored in a password protected computer. The 
survey may take up to 20 minutes. If you have any questions at all about the survey or 
the study, you may contact us at ###-###-#### or email@blank.edu.ii 
 
What you should know about a research study: 
•The instructions of this study will be explained to you on the following page. 
•A research study is something you volunteer for. 
•Whether or not you take part is up to you. 
•You should take part in this study only because you want to.  
•You can choose not to take part in the research study. 
•You can agree to take part now and later change your mind. 
•There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts involved in taking part in this 
study. 
•Whatever you decide it will not be held against you. 
•Feel free to ask all the questions you want before you decide. 
 
Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from: 
IRB Coordinator: Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
University of Central Florida (UCF) 
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501 
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Regan M. Stevenson                                      
Department of Management                                       
University of Central Florida 
 
Questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, concerns, or 
complaints: Regan Stevenson, Department of Management, College of Business  
###-###-#### or email@blank.edu. 
 






Background Information/ Purpose of the study:  
When entrepreneurs need money to start a business they often reach out to friends, 
family, business associates and other investors and "pitch" those people on the merits 
of investing in their businesses. A proposed new regulation will allow new businesses 
to seek investment funds directly over the internet, referred to as "crowdfunding". We 
would simply like your opinions on a "crowdfunding" investment pitch. There are no 




Your Task:  
On the following pages you will view a short "crowdfunding" pitch by an entrepreneur. 
After viewing the pitch you will be asked a number of questions about your 
perceptions of the pitch and the entrepreneur. Please closely watch the video of the 
entrepreneur's pitch. You will not be asked to invest any real money, but you will be 
asked to provide your opinions on the entrepreneur's chance of future success and 
your potential interest in investing in the business. On the next page, before you 
begin the task, you will also be asked some questions about yourself, your preferences, 




Select the box below and click the next button when you are ready to continue. 
 
 
Survey begins (initial questions) 
 
Participants are then directed to a filler task 
 
PARTICIPANTS THAN ARRIVE TO THE STUDY EXPERIMENT PAGE 
The following instructions are presented: 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Please follow the link below to the crowdfunding site. When 
you arrive on the website, view the website and click PLAY to watch the video.  Pay 
close attention to all information as you will be asked questions about the website and 
video. 
 
When you click on the link below, a new web page will open up in another tab. 
However, please do not close this survey as you will need to return to this survey after 
you have viewed the website and watched the video. 
 
CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE WEBSITE  
 
 
Thank you again for your participation. 
 
Please note, you cannot proceed until you have visited the website above and watched 
the entire video. Once this is completed the NEXT button will appear below which will 
allow you to move forward with the survey. 
 
 
Participant clicks the link and views the experiment on a separate web page 
To ensure that the participant viewed the experimental stimuli in full, a 
JavaScript code was written into the Qualtrics survey that would not allow the 
participant to advance to the next stage of the survey until the external crowdfunding 
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website was visited and the video runtime was elapsed in full. This procedure reduced 
concerns that participants might proceed through the survey without viewing the 
experimental stimuli.  
 
 
Participant returns to the survey and finishes remaining questions 
 









4.3.2 Study Two Sample 
According to industry statistics, Kickstarter.com has nearly eleven million funders 
actively using the platform per month. 53% of these users are between the ages of 18 and 
34; further, 54% have completed a 4-year undergraduate degree, and 53% have between 
$0 and $50,000 in annual income (Kickstarter, 2015). Moreover, 70% of the resource 
providers on Kickstarter are first time crowdfunders. The mean funder investment on the 
platform is $76.19 (Kickstarter, 2015). 
To obtain a sampling pool representative of the wide-ranging and diverse 
demographic makeup of this nascent crowdfunding investors, I used a group of individual 
“recruiters” to identify and gain approval from individuals that met the general 
demographic characteristics of a nascent crowdfunder and who had at least some basic 
financial knowledge and, at minimum, some basic previous experience with any type of 
investment vehicle (e.g., mutual funds, stocks, bonds). The recruiters originated from a 
large public University in the Southeastern region of the United States. The recruiters 
participated in this sample participant recruitment task in exchange for extra course credit 
in an entrepreneurship-related course. 
In total, 329 recruiters were identified and asked to participate in the recruitment 
task. These 329 recruiters identified, obtained approval from, and presented the names 
and contact details of 280 qualifying individuals willing to participate as “study 
participants.” In addition to having basic financial and non-professional investment 
experience, each study participant was required to be a non-student of any college or 
university, be currently employed for a minimum of 20 hours per week, and be over the 
age of 21. This final study participant pool is also consistent with previous studies which 
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assessed pitch characteristics from non-professional investors (Chen et al., 2009; Letwin, 
Ford, & Stevenson, 2015).  
Survey participants were then emailed instructions and a link to the online survey. 
The participants then engaged in all steps of the survey (see Table 5 for the survey flow). 
Each eligible potential survey participant was emailed a link and invited to participate in 
the survey. This survey recruitment resulted in 215 completed survey participant 
responses that indicated a dominant promotion or prevention focus, and thus were 
eligible for inclusion in the experimental analysis. A total of 19 of the individuals that 
participated in the screening portion of the survey indicated via psychometric response 
that they had neither a dominant promotion nor prevention focus, thus these participants 
could not be analyzed in any of the experimental conditions as they could not be included 
in analysis of either regulatory fit or nonfit condition.  
To detect inattentive participant responses a manipulation check question (see 
Festinger, 1953; Highhouse, 2009), and a content check question (whereby participants 
answer questions about the content they viewed) were presented to participants. In total, 
eighty nine participants did not provide a manipulation check response consistent with 
the manipulation, while six participants failed to correctly answer the content check 
question. These cases were subsequently removed from the sample, leaving a final usable 
sample of 120 cases. The mean age of the final sample was 41.36 years of age with a 
standard deviation of 14.37. In terms of non-professional investment experience, 
participants had a mean of 10.48 years of experience, with a standard deviation of 10.08 





4.3.3 Study Two Measures  
4.3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Resource Acquisition 
I employed the willingness to invest scale, adapted from Baron et al. (2006) to 
measure resource acquisition likelihood. All items were rated along a 7-point Likert-type 
scale from definitely not to definitely. Items included, “How likely would you be to make 
an equity investment in this opportunity?” The reliability for this scale was .92.  
 
4.3.3.2 Manipulated Variable: Displays of Regulatory Focus 
I manipulated promotion displays and prevention displays by randomly altering 
the crowdfunding narratives and business videos that participants viewed. The business 
pitch was adapted from an actual crowdfunding pitch that had previously been posted on 
a popular crowdfunding website. Two versions of the pitch were developed. These 
versions differed by the inclusion of either promotion focused words/phrases or 
prevention focused words/phrases. All other aspects of the pitch, website, and campaign 
were identical. A detailed description of the manipulations appears as Appendix J.  
 
4.3.3.3 Independent Variable: Potential Resource Provider’s Promotion Focus 
I assessed individual participant promotion focus with an adapted version of 
Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda’s (2002) General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM) 
Promotion subscale. The GRFM was originally tailored to undergraduate student survey 
participants but has been utilized in a modified form extensively in organizational 
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literature as a suitable operationalization of promotion focus. This scale consists of nine 
items rated and was rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale with scale end points from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A sample promotion item is, “In general, I am 
focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life.” Reliability for this scale was .90. 
 
4.3.3.4 Independent Variable: Potential Resource Provider’s Prevention Focus 
I assessed individual participant prevention regulatory focus with an adapted 
version of Lockwood et al.’s (2002) General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM) 
Prevention Subscale. This scale consists of nine items rated and was rated on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale with scale end points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A 
sample promotion item is, “In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my 
life”. Reliability for this scale was .83.   
 
4.3.3.4 Control Variables  
I also captured basic demographics of participants including their age, gender, 
educational background, investment experience, and self-rated financial knowledge.   
 
4.3.4 Study Two Results   
4.3.4.1 Study Two statistical procedures  
Study Two was conducted to test the moderating role of regulatory fit on the 
relationship between displays of regulatory focus and resource acquisition in the context 
of an entrepreneurial pitch scenario. To test the moderation effect hypotheses, I 
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conducted a series of OLS regression analyses to determine the direction of the 
hypothesized moderation relationship. Although an alternative test, ANCOVA, could also 
be appropriate for between participant experimental data (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), the 
nature of ANCOVA as an omnibus test limits the researcher’s ability to derive results for 
the directional differences between groups (Field, 2009). Thus, I utilized the OLS 
regression technique to detect the direction of each discrete hypothesized influence (e.g., 
detect the direction of the interaction effect) on resource acquisition, rather than simply 
the presence or absence of manipulation-level effects.  
 
4.3.4.2 Study Two descriptive statistics 
Table 9 and Table 10 display the descriptive statistics, including means, standard 
deviations and correlations for Study Two. Overall, the non-professional investor sample 
indicated higher overall promotion focus disposition ( x̅ = 5.61, s.d.= 0.92), in 
comparison with a prevention focus disposition ( x̅ = 4.26, s.d.= 1.12). Sample 
participants also indicated their education on a continuous scale: “1” less than high 
school, “2” high school, “3” some college, “4” 4-year college degree, “5” graduate 
degree (e.g., MBA, PhD). The mean of this control variable was 3.78 with a standard 
deviation of 0.76. Sample participants also self-assessed their own investment knowledge 
by indicating their level of investment knowledge from “1” basic investment knowledge 
to “3” advanced investment knowledge. The mean of this control variable was 1.65 with 




4.3.4.3 Study Two hypothesis tests  
Hypothesis 2a proposed that a potential resource provider’s promotion focus 
would moderate the relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource 
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider promotion focus is high, 
resource acquisition will be increasingly positive. The results of the statistical analysis 
are shown in Table 11. Model 1 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to 
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The analysis of a model 
without additional control variables is appropriate under experimental or quasi-
experimental conditions (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Indeed, statistical controls 
are to be regarded as an option of last resort in such contexts (Shadish et al., 2002). This 
approach is also consistent with recommendations from Becker (2005) in which the 
results should be reported first without control variables, and subsequently with control 
variables. If the results do not differ, then the control model can be ruled out as an 
explanatory alternative. Following these recommendations, the potential resource 
provider promotion focus variable and the potential resource provider prevention focus 
variable were entered into the model exclusively. The potential resource provider 
promotion coefficient in model 1 was positive and significant (β = 0.60; p≤0.01) and thus 
hypothesis 2a was supported.  
To further assess this relationship a second OLS regression analysis was run but 
this time the additional demographic controls including age, gender, educational 
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the 
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 2 shows the 
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 3 shows the results of the 
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full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis 
demonstrate that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus remained 
positive and significant (β = 0.38; p ≤0.05) and thus provided additional support for 
hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2b proposed that a potential resource provider’s prevention focus 
would moderate the relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource 
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider prevention focus is high, 
resource acquisition will be increasingly positive. The results of the statistical analysis 
are shown in Table 11. Model 4 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to 
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The use of a model without 
additional control variables in a controlled experimental study is consistent with 
recommendations from Becker (2005). Thus, the potential resource provider prevention 
focus variable and the potential resource provider promotion focus variable were entered 
into the model exclusively. The potential resource provider prevention coefficient in 
model 4 was positive and significant (β = 0.50; p≤0.05) and thus hypothesis 2b was 
supported.  
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But 
this time the additional demographic controls including age, gender, educational 
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the 
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 5 shows the 
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 6 shows the results of the 
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis 
demonstrate that the coefficient for potential resource provider prevention focus remained 
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positive and significant (β = 0.06; p≤0.05) and thus provided additional support for 
hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 3a proposed that a potential resource provider’s promotion focus 
would moderate the relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource 
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider promotion focus is high, 
resource acquisition will be increasingly negative. The results of the statistical analysis 
are shown in Table 11. Model 4 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to 
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The potential resource 
provider promotion coefficient in model 4 was not significant (β = 0.19; n.s) and thus 
hypothesis 3a was not supported.  
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But 
this time the additional demographic controls, including age, gender, educational 
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the 
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 5 shows the 
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 6 shows the results of the 
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis also 
indicated that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus was not 
significant (β = 0.55; n.s), further confirming the lack of support for hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 3b proposed that a potential resource provider’s prevention focus 
would moderate the relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource 
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider prevention focus is high, 
resource acquisition will be increasingly negative. The results of the statistical analysis 
are shown in Table 11. Model 1 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to 
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test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The potential resource 
provider prevention coefficient in model 1 was not significant (β = 0.17; n.s) and thus 
hypothesis 3b was not supported.  
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But 
this time the additional demographic controls, including age, gender, educational 
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the 
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 2 shows the 
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 3 shows the results of the 
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis also 
indicated that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus was not 
significant (β = 0.11; n.s), further confirming the lack of support for hypothesis 3b. 
 
4.3.4.4 Study Two robustness tests  
To test the robustness of the logistic regression analysis findings, I retested the 
hypothesized relationships that were found to be significant by using additional 
dependent variables that were similar on their face and theoretically related to resource 
acquisition. Specifically, I retested all hypotheses using four alternative outcome 
measures previously used in new venture pitch and investment research. They include 
Baron et al.’s (2006) Chance of Venture Success measure, Baron et al.’s (2006) Overall 
Idea Quality measure, Baron et al.’s (2006) Entrepreneur Success Qualities measure, and 




Baron et al.’s (2006) Chance of Venture Success measure is a three-item measure 
that asks participants to consider both the entrepreneur and the idea in determining their 
assessment of the venture’s likelihood of success. This scale was assessed on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to “Definitely Not.” I used 
this measure as an alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource 
acquisition variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are 
shown in Table 12. Model 7 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test 
this relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their 
assessment of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition. 
The potential resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and 
significant (β = 0.58; p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the 
relationship tested in hypothesis 2a.  
Model 11 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.40; 
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 
2b.  
Baron et al.’s (2006) Overall Idea Quality measure is a one-item measure that 
asks participants to consider the practicality of the idea whether or not the idea will likely 
result in a profitable new venture. This scale was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to “Definitely Not.” I used this measure as a 
second alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource acquisition 
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variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in 
Table 12. Model 8 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.62; 
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 
2a.  
Model 12 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.58; 
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 
2b.  
Baron et al.’s (2006) measure of the personal success qualities of the entrepreneur 
is a one-item measure that asks participants to consider the practicality of the idea in 
order to determine whether the entrepreneur possesses the experience, training, and 
expertise necessary to develop this idea into a successful company. This scale was 
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to 
“Definitely Not”. I used this measure as a third alternative dependent variable to assess 
the robustness of the resource acquisition variable used in the baseline analysis. The 
results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 12. Model 9 shows the results of the 
OLS regression analysis used to test this relationship between a potential resource 
provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment of the chance of venture success in the 
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promotion focused pitch condition. The potential resource provider promotion coefficient 
in model was positive and significant (β = 0.48; p≤0.01) thus providing support for the 
robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 2a.  
Model 13 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.43; 
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 
2b.  
 Zacharakis et al.’s (2007) Firm High Growth Potential Assessment measure is a 
single item measure that asks participants to identify their assessment of the likelihood of 
venture growth. This scale was assessed on an 11-point scale with scale anchors of 10x or 
more on the investment and a complete loss of investment. I used this measure as a fourth 
alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource acquisition 
variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in 
Table 12. Model 10 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.78; 
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 
2a.  
Model 14 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this 
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment 
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of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential 
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was not significant, thus this fourth 
robustness test did not provide additional support for the robustness of the relationship 
tested in hypothesis 2b. One reason for the discrepancy between the relationship amid 
prevention-fit and this outcome variable and the other four outcome variables that had a 
positive and significant relationship, could be that although a “prevention-fit” facilitates a 
positive and favorable moderating relationship with willingness to invest relationship, the 
prevention focused nature of these investors may be such that, although they find the 
investment attractive enough to invest in, they do not ultimately believe it will obtain an 





CHAPTER FIVE: OVERALL DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Overall Discussion  
 
It is well understood that initial resource acquisition is critical for new venture 
growth and success (Mollick, 2014; Stinchcombe, 1965). However, the process by which 
entrepreneurs successfully acquire resources is less well understood. Indeed, the steps 
involved in acquiring resources or raising capital may not be sequential or particularly 
well-defined for nascent firms. This lack of clarity, along with the inherent difficulty 
associated with resource acquisition, contributes to the high failure rate of firms 
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014). Because the nascent stage 
of venture development is often opaque and ambiguous, entrepreneurs must send signals 
to external resource providers about the quality of their firm as well as their own personal 
qualities in an effort to attract these resources.  
As a result, a core area of interest for early-stage business advisory groups (e.g., 
incubators, accelerators, educators) focused on advising entrepreneurs on the best 
practices of pitching (e.g., how to properly signal to external resource providers). Much 
of this early-stage pitching advice tends to focus on sending signals about growth such as 
presenting and positioning the venture’s opportunity in the context of billion dollar 
industries, describing exponentially growing market segments, highlighting growth 
metrics, and revealing the likelihood of high exit valuations (Zwilling, 2015). The 
assessment of mean scores in the study did reveal that displays of promotion focus were 
much more common in entrepreneurs than were displays of prevention focus. Thus, this 
research provides some empirical support that entrepreneurs tend to use a promotion 
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focused signaling strategy more commonly as their default regulatory focus strategy. In 
addition, this dissertation provides researchers a new tool to assess regulatory focus in 
such context – a Computer Aided Textual Analysis (CATA) measure for assessing 
regulatory focus in venture pitches. 
The findings from Study One also reveal that, although promotion focused 
displays are much more common than prevention focus displays, both have a positive 
relationship with funding success. So, if both promotion and prevention focus displays 
can effectively result in enhancing an entrepreneur’s likelihood of garnering resources, 
does this mean that an entrepreneur is equally likely to succeed across a variety of 
contexts with either type of dominant regulatory focus display? In other words, under 
what conditions might the entrepreneur’s displays of promotion or prevention focus 
differentially impact their ability to acquire resources? 
To address this secondary research question I drew upon regulatory fit theory and 
investigated regulatory focus and fit at the level of the external resource provider. 
Regulatory fit theory posits that an individual’s preferred actions are contingent upon that 
individual’s regulatory focus (Freitas & Higgins, 2002a; Higgins, 2000b), such that the 
individual will experience amplified motivation and action when a high level of regulator 
fit between the regulatory focus of the actor and the manner in which that actor pursues 
the goal. Coupling regulatory fit theory with prior research that suggests that 
interpersonal chemistry between entrepreneurs and external resource providers is a 
crucial factor that facilitates resource allocation (Chen et al., 2009; Riquelme & Watson, 
2002) allowed me to investigate a moderation model that featured the amplification effect 
of regulatory fit in the resource acquisition process. Thus, I investigated the moderating 
87 
 
role of two types of fit (i.e., promotion-fit, prevention-fit) and two types of misfit (i.e., 
promotion misfit, prevention misfit). Although I found no significant negative effects in 
the case of misfit, this research did find support that regulatory fit has a positive 
moderating influence on the relationship between regulatory focus displays and resource 
acquisition.  
Specifically, with regard to the two types of regulatory fit, I first investigated how 
an individual’s promotion focus incrementally increased the individual’s intentions to 
provide resources when exposed to a promotion focused pitch. Second, I investigated 
how an individual’s prevention focus incrementally increased the individual’s intentions 
to provide resources when exposed to a prevention focused pitch. In both cases, I found 
robust support that an investor’s regulatory fit with pitch framing incrementally 
strengthens the investor’s intentions to provide resources to the new venture.  
In this way, this work speaks to a wide body of entrepreneurship literature that 
seeks to identify the antecedents of resource acquisition (e.g., MacMillan et al., 1986; 
Mason & Harrison, 2004; Maxwell et al., 2011; Shepherd, 1999a). Much of this prior 
work has utilized cognitive frameworks or explicitly rational models to understand such 
relationships. For instance, Maxwell et al. (2011) identified eight key criteria to explain 
how investors make decisions on a non-compensatory basis with investment rejection 
occurring by way of calculable quantifiable deficiencies. In addition to Maxwell et al.’s 
(2011) approach, there are several related scholarly investigations that seek to identify the 
key cognitive criteria of various types of resource providers (e.g., Feeney et al., 1999; 




This dissertation supplements the extant rationally-based approaches by moving 
toward a model that infuses the role of non-cognitive (or less than fully cognitive) 
resource provider factors in the resource acquisition process. The theoretical constructs 
investigated herein, regulatory focus and regulatory fit, have recently been discussed in 
the organizational literature as non-cognitive psychological constructs (Johnson et al., 
2010). Rather than theorizing that an individual’s self-regulatory motivations are fully 
cognitive, Johnson et al. (2010) describe an individual’s promotion or prevention focus as 
conative in nature. A conative impulse might be considered purposeful, but not 
necessarily completely rational.  
Notwithstanding the conative nature of this construct, promotion and prevention 
focus are still considered to be highly influential in driving perceptions, intentions and 
behaviors in a variety of settings (Ferris et al., 2013; Gorman et al., 2012; Lanaj et al., 
2012). This dissertation finds evidence that regulatory fit, a conative or less than fully 
cognitive construct, plays a role in the context of new venture resource acquisition, 
thereby contributing to the existing body of literature that focuses on understanding the 
key antecedents to new venture resource provider decision making (Feeney et al., 1999; 
Korniotis & Kumar, 2011; MacMillan et al., 1986; Mitteness et al., 2010; Shepherd, 
1999b). Moreover, this finding specifically seeks to make a contribution to the 
burgeoning literature stream that is concerned with investigating the non-cognitive 
influences in the context of new venture decision making.  
Although, in theory, it is well accepted that non-cognitive factors play a role 
(Baron et al., 2006; Grégoire et al., 2015; Mitchell et al., 2007; Shepherd, 1999a), there 
has been little empirical work that has investigated and provided evidence with regard to 
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how these factors influence potential resource provider decisions. However, research 
focused in the area of non-cognitive (i.e., affective and emotional) factors that drive new 
venture resource acquisition and entrepreneurship decision-making in general is a 
growing and fruitful area (Shepherd et al., 2015). Specifically, this dissertation adds to 
this scholarly discussion by highlighting the role of regulatory focus, a well-established 
psychological construct that theoretically operates in a conative (i.e., less than fully 
cognitive manor) in the new venture resource acquisition process.  
Overall, in this dissertation I drew upon a well-established stream of social-
psychology research in order to investigate the role of conative factors in early-stage 
investment decision making. In doing this I used a quasi-experimental regulatory focus 
approach in to develop a conceptual framework that explains how resource acquisition 
for new firms is influenced by factors at multiple levels (i.e. the firm/entrepreneur level 
and individual investor level).  
 
5.2 Limitations  
This research has several limitations. First, in Study One I used archival 
crowdfunding data from a single rewards based platform. The sample was derived from 
the population of Kickstarter crowdfunding pitches between 2009 and 2012. One 
potential issue with this data is that it was derived during a time period in which 
crowdfunding was in its early development. From this data it is not possible to ascertain 
the extent to which crowdfunding pitch styles have been modified in more recent years. 
Thus, whether or not the results generalize from the time period studied to future time 
90 
 
periods is not certain. However, using data from four years does offset some of the 
generalizability risk. As well, the sample platform and timeframe used in Study One 
matches samples used in other published crowdfunding research (e.g., Mollick, 2014), 
thereby enhancing comparability to such studies.  
Second, using archival data in Study One, I was unable to measure any 
individual-level resource provider differences. Thus, the Study One data does not provide 
any opportunity to assess regulatory fit hypotheses. To address this concern, I completed 
a quasi-experimental study (Study Two). 
Study Two also has several limitations. First, the participants in Study Two were 
not making actual investments. Rather, the participants were asked to rate their 
willingness to invest using an established measure. Although such a measure is common 
in organizational research it is not possible to identify the extent to which participant 
intentions in this study might differ from actual investment behaviors. However, by 
conducting a mixed-methodological design using both archival crowdfunding data (Study 
One) and quasi-experimental data (Study Two) I attempted to directly address this 
limitation.  
A second limitation of Study Two relates to the fixed stimuli presented to 
participants. By design all variables other than promotion and prevention displays were 
isolated in accordance with experimental manipulation best practices. Thus, I utilized and 
manipulated only one pitch representing only one industry. In effect this methodology 
controls for industry and limits alternative explanations at the industry-level. However, 
this method does not explicitly make it possible to assess how the results obtained in 




5.3 Future Research & Practical Implications  
 
Given that regulatory focus has a momentary (state-based) component, much 
research has been dedicated to uncovering effective priming conditions for the 
inducement of momentary promotion or prevention focus in experimental settings 
(Freitas & Higgins, 2002b; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney et al., 1999). Studies in the social-
psychology field have shown that priming can occur either through an incidental 
manipulation or an integral manipulation. 
First, incidental priming is achieved by asking participants to be self-reflective. 
For instance, Freitas and Higgins (2002b) asked participants to reflect upon their past and 
present ideal or ought goals. Likewise, Higgins et al. (2001) induced promotion and 
prevention focus by asking participants to write down a past experience in which they 
made progress toward becoming successful in life.  
Second, another set of studies has shown that promotion and prevention 
inducements can be achieved through an integral manipulation. In such cases researchers 
frame or manipulate an initial priming message or the environmental setting in which the 
experiment will take place. For instance, Lee and Aaker (2004) induced participants into 
a promotion or prevention foci respectively by presenting them with two different 
hypothetical marketing messages. In Lee and Aaker’s study half of the participants were 
induced into a promotion focus when they viewed the following message:  
“Preliminary medical research suggests that drinking purple grape juice may 
contribute to the creation of greater energy! Growing evidence suggests that diets 
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rich in Vitamin C and iron lead to higher energy levels. According to research by the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Welch’s Purple 100% Grape Juice has 
more than three times the naturally-occurring Vitamin C and iron than other juices. 
Our Concord grapes and Niagara grapes are harvested only at the peak of flavor so 
that Welch’s Grape Juice is great tasting as well as energizing. Plus, it is simply fun 
to drink!” 
On the other hand, the other half of the participants were induced into a prevention focus 
when they viewed the following message: 
“Further, preliminary medical research suggests that drinking purple grape juice 
may contribute to healthy cardiovascular function. Growing evidence suggests that 
diets rich in antioxidants may reduce the risk of some cancers and heart disease. 
According to research by the United States Department of Agriculture, Welch’s 
Purple 100% Grape Juice has more than three times the naturally-occurring 
antioxidant capacity of other juices. Purple grape juice’s antioxidants are commonly 
attributed to the flavonoids contained in the juice that help keep arteries clear so that 
blood can flow freely. Therefore, it is healthy to drink!” 
 Understanding that promotion and prevention focus can be primed opens up the 
possibility that organizational actors might be able to derive strategies to induce a 
promotion and prevention focus in external resource providers. Thus, future research that 
investigates how promotion or prevention focus priming can influence the regulatory 
focus of investors could provide additional insight. Specifically, one could envision 
experimental work where investors are primed incidentally through self-reflective 
questions, or integrally through the manipulation of experimental environments.  
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If such priming techniques are shown to be effective in the lab, it is not a stretch 
to envision how such techniques could be used in practice. For instance, an entrepreneur 
hoping to prime promotion focus in his audience using an incidental technique might 
open his pitch by asking the investors in the room to think back to their first monumental 
achievement in their business lives. Likewise, to prime promotion focus integrally, an 
entrepreneur could allow a PowerPoint title slide with the company name and a picture of 
a rocket blasting off to linger on the screen for several minutes before the beginning of 
the pitch.  
5.4 Conclusion 
 In this disseration, I investigated the role of regulatory focus in the new venture 
resource acquisition process across two studies. In the first study, I sought to understand 
the relationship between entrepreneur displays of promotion and prevention focus and the 
entrepreneur’s objective ability to aquire resources. To achieve this I conducted a field 
study by selecting a random sample of 900 crowdfunding campaigns from a set of over 
45,815 crowdfunding campaigns that occurred between 2009 and 2012. The textual and 
video narratives from these campaigns were captured from the public domain and 
subsequently analysed using CAT Scanner software, a windows-based CATA tool that 
allows researchers to compute count variables for their constructs of interest (McKenny 
& Short, 2012). In addition, I developed a novel measure of promotion and prevention 
focus for CATA by following the best practices of CATA dictionary development 
(McKenny et al., 2013; Short et al., 2010). Next, using this measure and the CAT 
Scanner tool, I computed count variables for the displays of promotion for each of the 
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campaigns in the sample. The results of a statistical analysis robustly showed that both 
promotion and prevention focus had positive and significant relationships with resource 
acquisition.  
 In Study Two, I extended these findings and considered the interaction effect of 
regulatory fit in the resource acquisition process. Specifically, I conducted a quasi-
experiemental study in which non-professional investors were randomly assigned to 
either a promotion focused new venture pitch condition or a prevention focused new 
venture pitch condition. The results of this study provided support that both promotion-fit 
and prevention-fit  had an incremental effect on the relationship between promotion 
focused displays and resource acquisition and prevention focused displays and resource 
acquisition respectively.  
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation speak directly to two 
burgeoning literature streams. First, this work provides evidence that non-cognitive 
resource provider factors can play an influential role in new venture resource acquisition. 
Second, the findings from this dissertation provide evidence that regulatory fit between 
entrepreneur displays and resource provider’s self-regulatory disposition is predictive of 
increased investment intentions.  
From a practical perspective, this dissertation draws attention to the role of 
prevention focused displays in the pitch process. Although the vast majority of the 
entrepreneurship press tends to celebrate “game changing” entrepreneurs with promotion 
focused risk-seeking characteristics, this work shows that when entrepreneurs display that 
they are cautious, well-ordered, and loss-minimizing prevention focused, they are just as 
likely to be successful at acquiring resources. Moreover, given the right set of prevention 
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focused investors, these entrepreneurs may be incrementally more likely to succeed in 




APPENDIX A:  





Table 6: Study One Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable Mean S.D
1. Resource Acquisition - Success 0.51         0.50         
2. Resource Acquisition - Total Funding 4421.86 12277.90
3. Campaign Duration 39.90       17.67       
4. Funding Target 9556.10 23623.21
5. Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick 0.12         0.33
6. Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech 0.22         0.42
7. Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary 0.10         0.31
8. Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped 0.24         0.43
9. Promotion Focus Signals 4.30         5.28         
10. Prevention Focus Signals 2.30         2.90         
Note:  n = 895
** p ≤ .01,  * p  ≤ .05
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Table 7: Study One Correlation Table 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Resource Acquisition - Success
2. Resource Acquisition - Total Funding 0.27 **
3. Campaign Duration -0.09 ** 0.02
4. Funding Target -0.19 ** 0.23 ** 0.00
5. Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick 0.24 ** 0.24 ** 0.03 0.06
6. Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech 0.05 0.17 ** 0.01 0.13 ** 0.06
7. Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary -0.03 0.10 ** -0.04 0.08 ** 0.01 0.11 **
8. Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped -0.03 0.19 ** -0.01 0.15 ** 0.11 ** 0.20 ** 0.12 **
9. Promotion Focus Signals 0.08 * 0.35 ** 0.00 0.18 ** 0.12 ** 0.21 ** 0.10 ** 0.21 **
10. Prevention Focus Signals 0.06 0.26 ** 0.01 0.24 ** 0.14 ** 0.22 ** 0.11 ** 0.27 ** 0.47 **
Note:  n = 895
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Table 8: Study One Regression Results 
Variables
Controls 
Campaign Duration -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Funding Target Logged -0.63 ** -0.71 ** 0.18 ** 0.12
Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick 2.23 ** 2.12 ** 2.23 ** 2.08 **
Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech 0.54 ** 0.43 * 0.18 ** 0.12 *
Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08
Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped 0.06 -0.09 0.31 ** 0.23 **
Year Control: 2010 1.02 0.98 0.78 0.77
Year Control: 2011 1.14 1.02 0.83 0.72
Year Control: 2012 1.13 0.99 0.68 0.57
Category Control: Art -0.37 -0.20 -0.09 0.10
Category Control: Design -0.72 -0.63 -1.03 -0.75
Category Control: Fashion -1.59 ** -1.51 * -1.92 ** -1.84 **
Category Control: Food -0.23 -0.19 0.00 0.00
Category Control: Games -0.48 -0.77 -0.43 -0.75
Category Control: Music 0.31 0.47 0.34 0.51
Category Control: Photography -0.69 -0.62 -0.29 -0.15
Category Control: Publishing -1.29 ** -1.26 * -1.17 ** -1.09 **
Category Control: Technology -1.65 * -1.42 -1.29 -0.97
Category Control: Theater 0.22 0.33 0.37 0.47
Category Control: Video & Film 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.12
Direct Effects
Promotion Focus Signals 0.04 * 0.05 **





R 2 0.178 0.203
Change in R 2 0.025
F(df)
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1. Resource Acquisition - Willingness to Invest 4.00         1.47         
2. Potential Resource Provider Promotion Focus 5.61 0.92
3. Potential Resource Provider Prevention Focus 4.26 1.12
4. Age 41.36 14.37
5. Gender 0.50 0.50
6. Education 3.78 0.76
7. Investment Experience 10.48 10.08
8. Investment Knowledge 1.65 0.63
Note:  n = 120.
Gender, 1=male, 0=female. 









Variable Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Resource Acquisition - Willingness to Invest 4.00         1.47         
2. Potential Resource Provider Promotion Focus 5.61 0.92 0.31 **
3. Potential Resource Provider Prevention Focus 4.26 1.12 0.24 ** 0.13
4. Age 41.36 14.37 -0.28 ** -0.31 ** -0.26 **
5. Gender 0.50 0.50 -0.19 * -0.04 -0.12 -0.06
6. Education 3.78 0.76 -0.06 0.00 -0.31 ** 0.08 0.06
7. Investment Experience 10.48 10.08 -0.16 -0.24 ** -0.29 ** 0.79 ** 0.00 0.06
8. Investment Knowledge 1.65 0.63 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07 0.17 0.24 ** 0.13 0.29 **
Note:  n = 120.
Gender, 1=male, 0=female. 
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Potential Resource Provider 
Promotion Focus 0.60 ** 0.38 * 0.19 0.55
Potential Resource Provider 
Prevention Focus 0.17 0.11 0.50 * 0.06 *
Controls 
Age -0.06 ** -0.05 * -0.04 -0.03
Gender -0.85 * -0.68 * 0.02 0.35
Education 0.12 0.15 -0.04 0.11
Investment Experience 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
Investment Knowledge -0.25 -0.24 -0.26 -0.47
R 2 0.15 0.24 0.29 0.16 0.07 0.21
F(df)
Change in R 2 0.05 0.14
Model 6
Note.  n=120,  ** p ≤ .01,  * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 
4.10 (2, 46) 4.08 (5, 64) 3.61 (7, 62) 6.55 (2, 68) 0.62 (5, 42) 1.52 (7, 40)
Model 1 Model 4 Model 5Model 2



























Potential Resource Provider 
Promotion Focus 0.58 ** 0.62 ** 0.48 ** 0.78 *
Potential Resource Provider 
Prevention Focus 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.13
R 2 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.08
F(df)
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Condition 1:    
Promotion Pitch 
Condition 1:    
Promotion Pitch 
Condition 1:    
Promotion Pitch 
Condition 1:    
Promotion Pitch 
7.19 (2, 70) 5.06 (2, 70) 4.63 (2, 70) 3.11 (2, 70)












Study Two Robustness Tests (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Variables
Potential Resource Provider 
Promotion Focus 0.12 0.01 -0.08 0.24
Potential Resource Provider 
Prevention Focus 0.40 ** 0.58 ** 0.43 ** -0.25
R 2 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.01
F(df)
Note.  n=120,  ** p ≤ .01,  * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 


















Model  11 Model  12 Model  13 Model  14
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"accomplishes" "dreamer" "lofty goal"
"accomplishing" "dreaming" "lofty goals"
"accomplishment" "eager" "make happen"
"accomplishments" "eagerly" "make it happen"
"achievable" "elevate" "make this happen"
"achieve" "elevates" "making good"
"achieved" "elevating" "making it happen"





"advance" "enhancing" "perfect world"
"advanced" "excellence " "pinnacle"
"advancement" "exemplar" "prevail"




"all I can be" "expansion" "reward"
"all we can be" "faultless" "rewarding"
"ambition" "faultlessly" "rewards"
"ambitions" "favorable" "scalable"
"ambitious" "full potential" "stretch goal"
"ambitiously" "gain momentum" "stretch goals"
"apex" "gaining" "succeed"
"aspirant" "game change" "succeeded"
"aspirants" "game changer" "succeeding"















"aspirations" "get farther ahead" "successful"
"aspire" "go big" "successfully"







"better" "improve" "went for it"
"big idea" "improvement" "win"
"big ideas" "improves" "winnable"
"bring about" "improving" "winner"
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"anxious" "forfeit" "prove out"
"anxiously" "forfeited" "proving out"
"avoid" "forfeiture" "prudence"
"avoidance" "go bankrupt" "prudent"
"avoiding" "go wrong" "prudently"












"close down" "maintains" "safeguarded"
"commit" "make mistakes" "safeguarding"
"commitment" "mandate" "safeguards"
"commitments" "mandated " "safely"
"committed" "mandates" "scrupulous"
"conservative" "mandatory" "scrupulously"
"conservatively" "market test" "scrupulousness"
"conserve" "market testing" "secure"




Prevention Focused Dictionary (Continued) 
 
  
"conserving" "minimizing waste" "self-preservation"
"covenant" "must" "should"
"covenants" "need to" "statute"
"customer feedback" "needed to" "statutes"
"danger" "negative outcome" "threat"
"dangers" "negative outcomes" "threats"
"dedicated" "negatives" "thwart"
"defend" "no choice" "thwarting"
"defending" "oath" "to survive"








"down the drain" "operating procedure" "validation"









"fall short" "preventive" "watchful"
"falling short" "preventively" "watchfully"
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… since that 2006 show, the full band formed, and we achieved success beyond my 
wildest dreams.
… my non-fiction book “The Cannon King’s Daughter: Banished from a Dynasty, the 
True, untold Story of Engelbertha Krupp.” Sure to be a game changer in terms of 
German history.
… become involved in the marketing of one of the greatest stories ever told.
… we’ve seen some great critical acclaim and we’re gaining traction
… A famous author once wrote, “Man improves himself as he follows his path.”  I 
think about that when I look at this image.  I think about how important it is as a 
filmmaker to be able to see possibilities before they become obvious. 
… we truly need all of our fans to assist us in achieving our dream.
Promotion Dictionary
Representative excerpts from crowdfunding narratives
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Table 16: Language Indicative of Prevention Focus 
 
  
… why not truly guard it so you can be sure your lens will work and your investment 
will be protected.  
… Wilson's findings have been validated by three independent labs, multiple engineers, 
and his design has been approved for mass-start races by the US Cycling Federation. 
      
… because they have turned me into something I should not be.  At that very moment I 
realized …
… and yet there have been no solutions to protect them while on your camera....until 
now.  
Prevention Dictionary
Representative excerpts from crowdfunding narratives
… Many Americans may have noticed in the last century, we have been asked to 
sacrifice more and more of our freedoms for the promise of greater security and 
greater safety.  And while every American wants to feel safe and secure…
… and we feel a need to protect, preserve and celebrate this.
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Table 17: Study Two Manipulations 
 
Participant arrives on the landing page, reviews, the details of the crowdfunding campaign (see 






Once the participant arrives on the webpage, the identical video will begin to play   
with the following script voiced over in the two conditions identified below 
 
Condition 1: Promotion Focus Displays Condition 2: Prevention Focus Displays 
 
Hi I’m Chris  
and I’m Patrick,  
and we’re two brothers from Austin, Texas who 
are passionate about hydration. 
 
As athletes we often aspired to track our water 
consumption in order to achieve our maximum 
potential. After years of competitive sport, we 
knew drinking more water could improve our 
performance. 
 
We realized that it would be ideal if we could 
track and better assess our water consumption in 
real time in order to be the best we could be on 
the field, court, or track. However, successfully 
tracking our consumption was a challenge. 
 
So we set a stretch goal to solve this problem but 
in the process of eagerly making it happen we 
uncovered a more important question, “How much 
water is optimal? And how is this optimal level 
different for different people?” 
 
 
Our ambitious research told us drinking the 
right amount of water was beneficial, as ideal 
water consumption has been shown to increase 
physical gains for professional athletes and 
weekend warriors alike. 
 
 
Hi I’m Chris  
and I’m Patrick, 
and we’re two brothers from Austin, Texas who are 
passionate about hydration. 
 
As athletes we often needed to track our water 
consumption in order to avoid dehydration and 
other negative outcomes. After years of 
competitive sport, we knew not drinking enough 
water could hinder our performance. 
 
We realized that we needed to track and carefully 
assess our water consumption in real time in order 
to avoid defeat on the field, court, or track. 
However, accurately tracking our consumption was 
a challenge. 
 
So we set a scrupulous goal to solve this problem 
but in the process of vigilantly and prudently 
working through this challenge we uncovered a 
more important question, “How much water should 
we be drinking? And how is this safe level 
different for different people?” 
 
Our calculated research told us not drinking 
enough water was dangerous, as failing to 
consume enough water has been shown to 
intensify the threat of physical injuries for 




However the biggest challenge to solving this 
problem is that we are all different in terms of our 
own optimal water consumption levels. In fact, 
many unique factors play a role; workout 
schedules, age, gender, location, sweat rate, and 
the weather all expand the equation. 
 
In the past, only elite athletes had access to 
advanced tools to dial-in on their optimal 
hydration levels, allowing them to attain and 
accomplish their training goals. 
 
But, like them, we also wanted to achieve success, 
so we thought ambitiously about how we could 
increase gains, obtain better results, and propel 
ourselves to victory on the field? 
 
 
Introducing the “Smart Bottle” – a mobile and 
connected smart water bottle. 
 
The “Smart Bottle” connects to an App on your 
smartphone using Bluetooth low energy. It runs on 
a commonly found replaceable battery. 
 
 
The “Smart Bottle” improves the measurement 
of daily water consumption in real-time. As well, 
the “Smart Bottle App” ideally connects to other 
devices allowing the app to build a personal 
profile and winning hydration schedule unique to 
you and your training aspirations.  
 
The initial design of the “Smart Bottle” is 
completed and patent-pending. We are now 
eagerly working on improving the App’s 
functionality before we release it to the market 
next year.  
 
We have identified a few options for distribution 
but have yet to attain an agreement with any 
distributors or retailers.  
 
However, all of the potential corporate customers 
we have talked to appear eager to further 
evaluate our product to ensure that it will go big 
once they begin to carry it in their stores.    
 
In terms of our lofty goals, we have an exemplary 
set of financial projections, centered on our 
scalable growth plans. We already have previous 
However the biggest challenge to solving this 
problem is that we are all different in terms of our 
own water consumption needs. In fact, many 
factors play a role, workout schedules, age, gender, 
location, sweat rate, and the weather are vital to the 
equation. 
 
In the past, only elite athletes had access to the tools 
needed to dial-in on their safe hydration levels, 
allowing them to vigilantly protect against falling 
short of their training goals. 
 
But, like them we also want to be sure to maintain 
our training commitments, so we thought 
carefully about how we could deter the risk of 
under consumption, thereby avoiding forfeiture 
and unpleasant losses on the field? 
 
Introducing the “Smart Bottle” – a mobile and 
connected smart water bottle. 
 
The “Smart Bottle” connects to an App on your 
smartphone using Bluetooth low energy. It runs on 
a commonly found replaceable battery. 
 
The “Smart Bottle” calculates daily water 
consumption in real-time. As well, the “Smart 
Bottle App” accurately connects to other devices 
allowing the app to build a personal profile and safe 
hydration schedule unique to you and your training 
commitments.  
 
The initial design of the “Smart Bottle” is 
completed and patent-pending. We are now 
carefully working on refining the App’s 
functionality before we release it to the market next 
year. 
 
We have identified a few options for distribution 
but have yet to secure an agreement with any 
distributors or retailers.  
 
However, all of the potential corporate customers 
we have talked to appear committed to market test 
our product to ensure nothing will go wrong once 
they begin to carry it in their stores.   
 
In terms of our business plan protocols, we have 
calculated a set of financial projections, centered 
on our worst case scenario analysis. We already 
have previous capital in place including a fully 
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capital in place including a fully funded “swing 
for the fences fund”, which will allow us to 
ambitiously roll-out and overcome any growth 
challenges we encounter.  
 
Our management team has significant new venture 
experience. Specifically, we have a proven track 
record of game changing success which has 
allowed us to get farther ahead of competitors 
and gain momentum during the new venture 
growth stage. Our team is now focused on 
bringing about change in the industry by 
executing on the winning strategy that we have in 
place to guide our launch.   
 
We believe the “Smart Bottle” represents an ideal 
early-stage investment opportunity for the right 
investors. Please join us in our mission to enhance 




funded “rainy day fund”, which will allow us to 
maintain a steady roll-out plan and overcome any 
growth challenges we encounter.   
 
Our management team has significant new venture 
experience. Specifically, we have a proven track 
record of minimizing waste and conserving 
capital in order to validate and derisk during the 
new venture growth stage. Our team is now focused 
on maintaining competitiveness in the industry by 
executing on the operating procedures that we 
have in place to guide our launch.   
  
 
We believe the “Smart Bottle” represents a secure 
early-stage investment opportunity for the right 
investors. Please join us in our mission to prevent 
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i A conative impulse might be considered purposeful, but not necessarily completely rational.  
Johnson et al. (2010) describe an individual's regulatory focus (promotion or prevention foci) as 
conative in nature. 
ii The actual phone number and email address presented in the experiment were removed from 
the displayed instructions in this dissertation for privacy purposes.  
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